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Caselaw Developments 2015

0VERVIEW 1

Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that an opinion can be false, for
securities law purposes, if the speaker or writer disbelieves the opinion when delivering it, if the opinion includes embedded facts that are false, or if, in context,
a reasonable investor would be misled by the omission of material facts relating
to the opinion, such as the analysis or investigation on which it is based. 2
SEC rulemahing. The D.C. Circuit held invalid, as violating the First Amendment, the portion of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act") and implementing regulation that required public companies to include in their conflict minerals disclosures statements that
certain products were not "DRC conflict free. "3
SEC enforcement actions. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a judgment that a public relations firm aided and abetted a client's Rule lOb-5 violation and that the
public relations firm had violated the registration requirement by selling stock
with which the client paid for services. 4 Both the D.C. Circuit and the Seventh
Circuit rejected attempts by respondents in administrative enforcement proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC' or "Commission")
to enjoin those proceedings on constitutional grounds by lawsuits that the respondents filed in federal district courts. 5
Proxy solicitation. The Third Circuit ruled that the "ordinary business operations" exception to Rule l 4a-8 permitted Wal-Mart to exclude from its proxy materials a shareholder resolution designed to discourage the retailer from selling
firearms with ten-round magazines. 6
Forward-looking statements. The D.C. Circuit ruled that warning language accompanying statements about inventory were not "meaningful" so as to invoke
the statutory protections for forward-looking statements where the warnings
did not disclose that the issuer was holding large amounts of obsolete product
1. The caselaw developments section covers opinions decided during the calendar year 2015.
Where this portion of the annual review expresses opinions, they are those of the author of the caselaw developments, William 0. Fisher, and not necessarily the opinions of other authors contributing
to the annual review, or of members of the subcommittee producing the review, or of the American
Bar Association.
2. See infra notes 29-65 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 82-129 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 130-62 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 163-96 and accompanying text.
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that it could not sell without heavy discounts. 7 The Eighth Circuit found an
issuer's statements that a federal regulator would protect the exclusivity of a
product to be "forward-looking" and that the issuer's cautions were "meaningful," in a case where the agency later declined to enforce the exclusivity. 8
Insider trading. Reacting to the 2014 Newman decision by the Second Circuit,
the Ninth Circuit held that the intangible benefit one family member derives
from making a gift to another family member suffices for the personal benefit
the original tipper must receive, and of which the tippee must know, in order
for the tippee to be liable under the traditional theory of insider trading. 9
Materiality. The D.C. Circuit held that a representation of "very strong sales"
was material, rejecting the issuer's argument that the statement constituted mere
puffery, where the issuer was accumulating obsolete inventory of the product to
which the statement referred. 10 The Second Circuit ruled that statements about
an acquisition-including that "[t]here are a lot of areas where [the acquired
company] just goes ching, ching, ching"-were puffery, and also held (although
the panel divided on this ruling) that, where the market knew a bank needed to
raise capital in the face of deteriorating conditions during the credit crisis, the
difference between whether a regulator "required" the bank to raise capital versus "encouraged" the bank to do so was immaterial. 11 The First Circuit held that
a thin showing of materiality argued against a finding of scienter, 12 and both the
First and the Second Circuits suggested that a defendant, in at least some contexts, can challenge the materiality of misrepresentations in transactions between
professionals in the financial industry even if professionals in that industrywho were involved in the transactions at issue-testify that the misrepresentations were important to them. 13
Duty to disclose. Disagreeing with a Ninth Circuit decision published in 2014, the
Second Circuit held that Regulation S-K Item 303(a)(3)(ii) defines a duty to disclose, the violation of which can support a Rule lOb-5 claim, provided that the
omitted facts are material and the other elements of a Rule 1Ob-5 case are proved. 14
Scienter and scienter pleading. Courts of Appeals addressed scienter in cases
where plaintiffs asserted Rule lOb-5 claims criticizing (i) accounting, (ii) other
financial disclosures, and (iii) statements by issuers in the drug and medical device industry. The Ninth and Second Circuits addressed (iv) more general scienter questions.
Four notable decisions addressed scienter in cases involving alleged accounting wrongdoing. The Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiffs failed to adequately
plead scienter where they asserted that the issuer reported $100 million in
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cash but defaulted on a $3.5 million debt. 15 The Second Circuit found insufficient allegations that an auditor of a China-based company acted with severe
recklessness in failing to compare the financial results that the company submitted to a Chinese regulator with the results in the statements that the auditor audited for submission to the SEC. 16 The Tenth Circuit found wanting scienter allegations against a company that delayed disclosing a billing dispute with a
major customer until information about the dispute, which occurred in a foreign
country, escalated to the company's U.S. headquarters, management conducted
an investigation, and the company resolved the billing with the customer. 17 The
Fifth Circuit rejected scienter allegations as inadequate in a case based significantly on asserted misvaluation of mortgage-backed securities, with the court
emphasizing that such valuations required subjective judgments. 18
In an additional case where plaintiffs alleged financial fraud, the Tenth Circuit
ruled that plaintiffs adequately pled severe recklessness when a chief executive
officer ("CEO") allegedly mischaracterized the reason a strategic investor declined to complete the purchase of an interest in the issuer's assets, with the
court rejecting the CEO's argument that he was acting on behalf of the company
and its shareholders by couching his disclosure in terms calculated to preserve
the issuer's opportunity to sell the interest to some other party at a high price. 19
Two decisions considered scienter allegations against issuers in the drug and
medical device industry. The First Circuit found no adequate scienter pleading
where a company said-during a long-running interaction with the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") over off-label promotion-that the company had
a policy against off-label marketing and that it was cooperating with the
FDA. 20 The Fourth Circuit found scienter properly pled where the defendants
specifically described a meeting with the FDA and an FDA briefing document
but, in each case, left out information that showed a decreased chance that
the agency would approve the issuer's drugn
Finally, two cases addressed more general scienter issues. The Ninth Circuit
considered when the scienter of an officer can be imputed to his or her corporation. The court held that the "adverse interest" exception to such imputation
does not apply where the officer communicates with investors with apparent authority created by the companyn The Second Circuit decided that scienter does
not require an intent to harm. 23
Primary violation of Rule lOb-5 (b). The Seventh Circuit held that ]anus applies to determine which corporate officers "made" statements for purposes
of Rule lOb-S(b), and considered how the ]anus test-of actual control over
See
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content and dissemination-identifies appropriate officer defendants in private lawsuits based on press releases and other corporate disclosures. 24
Loss causation and reliance in open market cases. The Seventh Circuit set out a
protocol of shifting burdens of proof to account for non-fraud, firm-specific information in econometric models used for loss causation and damages. 25 In the
same case, the appellate court affirmed the manner in which a trial court-in a
second phase of a trial, following a first phase directed to class-wide issuesprovided the defense with an opportunity to challenge individual class member
reliance on the integrity of the market. 26 The Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in trial court certification of one class in the BP oil spill securities litigation,
where differences over whether certain disclosures were "corrective" raised common
questions, and no abuse of discretion in the denial of a second class, where plaintiffs' theory required a class-member-by-class-member determination of whether
the investor would have bought BP securities at all if the investor had known
that the company had no effective plan to deal with a catastrophic blowout. 27
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA"). The Second Circuit set
out an elaborate taxonomy of instances in which state-law claims might include
an allegation that someone-whether a defendant or another actor-violated the
anti-falsity provisions of the federal securities laws with respect to the purchase
or sale of "covered securities," as SLUSA defines that term, and, for each category, stated whether SLUSA precluded the allegation or not. 28
SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES OPINIONS

In Virginia Banhshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, the Supreme Court held directors' opinions, that a cash-out merger of minority stockholders for $42 per share provided a
"high" value and a "fair" price, were actionable as "facts" under section l 4(a)
and Rule l 4a-9 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). 29 The
Court reached that conclusion because those opinions were, in "a commercial
context[,]
reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis that justifie[d]
them as accurate, the absence of which render[ed] them misleading." 30 Thus,
"whether $42 was 'high,' and the proposal 'fair' to the minority shareholders,
depended on whether provable facts about the [issuer's] assets, and about actual

24. See infra notes 544-64 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 575-90 and accompanying text (discussing loss causation and burden shifting);
see also infra notes 571-604 and accompanying text (discussing the case generally).
26. See infra notes 591-604 and accompanying text (discussing rebuttal of presumption of reliance); see also infra notes 571-604 and accompanying text (discussing the case generally).
27. See infra notes 605-28 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 629-60 and accompanying text.
29. 501 U.S. 1083, 1088, 1091-95 (1991). Exchange Act section 14(a) makes it unlawful to use
the mails or interstate commerce to solicit a proxy to vote a security registered under section 12 of
that act if the solicitation violates rules prescribed by the SEC. 15 U.5.C. § 78n(a)(l) (2012). Rule
l 4a-9 prohibits solicitations "containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.l 4a-9 (2015) (emphasis added).
30. Virginia Banhshares, 501 U.S. at 1093.
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and potential levels of operation, substantiated a value that was above, below, or
more or less at the $42 figure, when assessed in accordance with recognized
methods of valuation." 31
The Court considered "whether disbelief, or undisclosed belief or motivation,
standing alone, should be a sufficient basis to sustain an action under § l 4(a),
absent proof by
objective evidence
that the statement also expressly
or impliedly asserted something false or misleading about its subject matter. "32
Virginia Banhshares held that "proof of mere disbelief or belief undisclosed
should not suffice for liability under§ 14(a)," but added that "it would be rare
to find a case with evidence solely of disbelief or undisclosed motivation without
further proof that the statement was defective as to its subject matter." 33 The Virginia Banhshares opinion generated considerable controversy over whether an
opinion, in order to be actionable under the securities laws, must be both subjectively false in the sense that the speaker or author disbelieves the opinion and
objectively false in the sense that the underlying facts the opinion implies are untrue. This question is particularly important in (i) cases where plaintiffs sue
under Rule lOb-5, because a claim under that rule includes a scienter element 34
that, by itself, seems to encompass subjective falsity when the case rests on defendants' stated opinions, and (ii) cases where plaintiffs make a claim under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"), which does not require
scienter, 35 and where therefore requiring subjective falsity appears to import a
mental state that the cause of action does not include. 36
In 2015, the Court revisited opinions in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund. 37 The plaintiffs brought a section 11 claim
against the issuer for including in a registration statement (i) its "belie[f that]
our contract arrangements with other healthcare providers, our pharmaceutical
suppliers and our pharmacy practices are in compliance with applicable federal
and state laws[,]" and (ii) its "belie[f that] our contracts with pharmaceutical manufacturers are legally and economically valid arrangements. "38 The plaintiffs alleged that, in fact, Omnicare's contracts violated anti-kickback laws. 39 In reversing
a district court dismissal, the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs "had to allege

31. Id. at 1094.
32. Id. at 1095-96.
33. Id. at 1096 (emphasis added).
34. See infra note 357 and accompanying text.
35. See In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cir. 2010).
36. See In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding, in a Rule
lOb-5 action, that objective falsity sufficed to prove that an opinion was false, with any required subjective falsity wrapped into the scienter analysis). Compare Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp Ltd., 551 F.3d
1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding opinions actionable, in a section 11 claim, "only if the complaint
alleges ... that the statements were both objectively and subjectively false or misleading").
37. 135 S Ct. 1318 (2015)
38. Id. at 1323.
39. Id. at 1324.
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only that the stated belief was 'objectively false'; they did not need to contend that
anyone at Omnicare 'disbelieved [the opinion] at the time it was expressed."' 40
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further consideration in light
of its extended analysis. 41 The majority opinion focused on the language of section 11, which provides a cause of action where a registration statement, at the
time it became effective, "contained an untrue statement of a material fact or
omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading." 42 Justice Kagan interpreted that
section to impose liability in two instances-Ci) where the opinion constituted
a false fact, 43 and (ii) where the opinion misled because it omitted material
facts. 44 Because a statement of belief-such as a CEO's belief that his or her company's contracts comply with the law-"explicitly affirms one fact: that the
speaker actually holds the stated belief," the stated belief "would subject the issuer to liability (assuming the misrepresentation were material)" if it "falsely describe [d the CEO's] state of mind." 45 The complaint in Omnicare did not allege
falsity in this first way because "the Funds d [id] not contest that Omnicare's
opinion was honestly held" and could therefore not prevail simply by showing
"that Omnicare's belief turned out to be wrong-that whatever the company
thought, it was in fact violating anti-kickback laws. "46 As Justice Kagan put it,
"a sincere statement of pure opinion is not an 'untrue statement of material
fact,' regardless whether an investor can ultimately prove the belief wrong." 47
The majority acknowledged that a stated belief might also be false if it "contain[ed] embedded statements of fact" (as where a CEO said "I believe our
TVs have the highest resolution available because we use a patented technology
to which our competitors do not have access") and the "supporting fact" was
false (e.g., that the issuer did not use a patented technology). 48 But Omnicare's
statements were "pure . . opinion[s]" that did not recite supporting facts. 49
The majority, however, concluded that the plaintiffs might prevail on the alternative theory that the issuer's statements of belief in its legal compliance were
misleading because those statements omitted facts. so The Court held that "a reasonable investor may, depending on the circumstances, understand an opinion
statement to convey facts about how the speaker has formed the opinion-or,
otherwise put, about the speaker's basis for holding that view. "51 If that were
40. Id. (quoting Ind. State Dist. Council of Laborers & Hod Carriers Pension & Welfare Fund v.
Omnicare, Inc., 719 F.3d 498, 506 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d
105, 110 (2d Cir. 2011)))
41. Id. at 1333.
42. 15 USC § 77k(a) (2012)
4 3. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1326-27.
44. Id. at 1327-32.
45. Id. at 1326.
46. Id. at 1327.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1327-33.
51. Id. at 1328.
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the case, then, drawing on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "liability may result
from omission of facts-for example, the fact that the speaker failed to conduct
any investigation-that rebut the recipient's predictable inference. "52 Whether
an expressed belief would lead a reasonable investor to understand some underlying basis for the speaker's opinion and, if so, what the reasonable investor
would understand that basis to be will depend, the majority said, on context. 53
Thus, an investor will assume that more careful analysis underlies an expressed
belief in a "formal document[]" like a registration statement than in "off-the-cuff
judgments," and an investor will also understand the analysis underlying an expressed opinion "in light of all its surrounding text, including hedges, disclaimers, and apparently conflicting information" and "customs and practices of the
relevant industry." 54 Moreover, whether a particular fact that cuts against an
opinion renders the opinion misleading because that fact is not disclosed depends on the omitted fact. Thus, if "in stating an opinion about legal compliance,
the issuer did not disclose that a single junior attorney expressed doubts about a
practice's legality, when six of his more senior colleagues gave a stamp of approval[,]
[t]hat omission would not make the statement of opinion misleading, even if the minority position ultimately proved correct. "55 That is because a
"reasonable investor does not expect that every fact known to an issuer supports
its opinion statement. "56 The majority emphasized that, in order to assert this
second basis for liability for an opinion, an "investor must identify particular
(and material) facts going to the basis for the issuer's opinion-facts about the
inquiry the issuer did or did not conduct or the knowledge it did or did not
have-whose omission makes the opinion statement at issue misleading to a reasonable person reading the statement fairly and in context. "57
The plaintiffs alleged in Omnicare "that an attorney had warned [the company]
that a particular contract 'carrie [d] a heightened risk' of legal exposure under
anti-kickback laws." 58 Thus, on remand, the lower court should "determine
whether [the complaint] adequately alleged that Omnicare had omitted that
(purported) fact, or any other like it, from the registration statement," taking
into "consideration of such matters [(i)] as the attorney's status and expertise
and other legal information available to Omnicare at the time ... [,(ii)] whatever
facts Omnicare did provide about legal compliance, as well as [(iii)] any other
hedges, disclaimers, or qualifications it included in its registration statement. "59

52. Id. at 1330 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 539 cmt. a (AM. LAw INST. 1976)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1329.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1332.
58. Id. at 1333 (quoting plaintiffs' complaint).
59. Id. (with the last including, "for example, the information Omnicare offered that States had
initiated enforcement actions against drug manufacturers for giving rebates to pharmacies, that the
Federal Government had expressed concerns about the practice, and that the relevant laws 'could
be interpreted in the future in a manner' that would harm Omnicare's business" (quoting registration
statement)).
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Significance and analysis. The most disturbing aspect of Omnicare is that the
majority did not attempt to integrate its analysis with Virginia Banhshares. This
is important in two respects. First, Virginia Banhshares held that an opinion cannot be a "fact" at all-for securities law prohibitions against making untrue statements of "fact"-unless the opinion is one that a reasonable investor would understand, in the relevant commercial context, to rest on proveable, underlying
objective facts. 60 Omnicare does not address this holding and, presumably leaves
it in place. Nevertheless, it is disturbing that the majority failed to expressly tie
the Virginia Banhshares analysis into the Omnicare analysis in this obvious way.
Second, Virginia Banhshares held expressly that subjective falsity is not enough
to impose liability for an opinion. 61 The Omnicare majority held that an opinion
is actionable if it is material and the author did not believe the opinion when he
or she professed. 62 Seeking to reconcile this view with Virginia Banhshares, the
majority characterized the earlier decision as dealing with "the rare hypothetical
case ... in which a speaker expresses an opinion that she does not actually hold,
but that turns out to be right." 63 The Omnicare majority then conceded that Virginia Banhshares "qualifies" the Omnicare holding so that no violation occurs
where the defendant, in stating a belief, thought "he was lying while actually
(i.e., accidentally) telling the truth about the matter addressed in his opinion. "64
This suggests that, in order to prevail on the theory that an opinion is false because the speaker or writer did not believe it, the plaintiff must plead and prove
both that the defendant did not believe the opinion and that the opinion was
objectively false. 65 On the other hand, where the plaintiff proceeds on the theory
that the opinion is false because "embedded facts" are false, the plaintiff will not
need to prove any subjective disbelief but only falsity of the embedded facts.
Similarly, if the plaintiff proceeds on the theory that, in context, the opinion misleads by omission, the plaintiff does not need to prove the speaker or writer disbelieved his or her opinion, but only that the omitted fact was material and rendered the opinion misleading. Omnicare does not address the relationship
between falsity and scienter in a Rule lOb-5 action.

SEC

RULEMAKING

The Dodd-Frank Act required the SEC to adopt a regulation directing public
companies to disclose information about conflict minerals necessary to the function or production of their products. 66 The SEC issued an elaborate implement-

60. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
62. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1326-27.
63. Id. at 1329 n.7.
64. Id. at 1326 n.2.
65. Perhaps, the majority meant that the objective truth is an affirmative defense.
66. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)
(2012))
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ing regulation. 67 In 2014, the D.C. Circuit rejected a challenge to that regulation,
with one exception. 68 The exception held unconstitutional a requirement, in the
statute and in the implementing regulation, that public companies identify certain products as not "DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] conflict free" in
reports that the companies had to file with the SEC and post on their websites. 69
After a subsequent decision in the same circuit upheld a requirement that meat
product labels include country-of-origin, 70 the panel that had published the
2014 opinion on the conflict minerals regulation reheard the constitutional challenge to that rulen In 2015, the panel (two to one) adhered to its 2014 view and
struck down-as violating the First Amendment-the part of the statute and the
part of the regulation demanding that issuers publicly identify products as not
"DRC conflict free," a requirement that, in the majority's view, forced companies
to publicly shoulder moral responsibility for atrocities in the Congo. 72
The D.C. Circuit considered the challenged requirement under two different
tests: (i) the test applicable to commercial speech, which can be compelled provided that (a) the government seeks to advance a substantial interest, and (b) the
required speech directly advances that interest in a manner that could not be accomplished as well by a narrower intrusion on free expression; and (ii) the test
applicable to factual and uncontroversial information about products and services, which can be compelled if the required speech is reasonably related to
the government's interest in protecting consumers from deceptive advertising. 73
As to the first part of the first test, the D.C. Circuit majority found that the government interest behind the requirement that public companies identify certain
products as not "DRC conflict free" was to "ameliorat[e] the humanitarian crisis
in the DRC. "74 The majority treated this as "a sufficient interest of the United
States." 75 The requirement, however, could not pass the second part of the
first test because the notion that the reporting requirement would reduce atrocities in the Congo rested on "speculation or conjecture. "76

67. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 &
249b)
68. Nat'! Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Nat1 Ass'n of Mfrs. I],
overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en
bane); see Case/aw Developments 2014, 70 Bus. LAw. 903, 911-16 (2015) [hereinafter 2014 Case/aw Developments] (discussing Nat1 Ass'n of Mfrs. I).
69. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. I, 748 F.3d at 370-73.
70. Am Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 20; id. at 22-23 (repudiating Nat1Ass'n of Mfrs. I, 748 F.3d at 370-73).
71. Nat'! Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 519-20 (D.C. Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Nat'l Ass'n of
Mfrs. II].
72. Id. at 530.
73. Id. at 519-30. The test for commercial speech derives from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v.
Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). The test for disclosures designed to
prevent deception of consumers derives from Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
74. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. II, 800 F.3d at 524 (quoting SEC brief).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 524-27 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)).
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The D.C. Circuit majority held that the second test did not apply because the
required disclosure was not related to advertising or protection of consumers. 77
Moreover, even if the test did apply, the disclosure that particular products were
not "DRC conflict free" was not limited to factual and uncontroversial information. 78 Instead, it required companies to accept moral responsibility for wrongdoing, even though that responsibility was a matter of significant disagreement. 79
SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

The Eleventh Circuit held last year that a public relations firm was liable for
aiding and abetting its client's fraud on brokers and investors and also that the
firm violated the registration requirement by taking stock from the client in payment of fees and then reselling the stock to raise cash needed for operations. 80
Both the D.C. Circuit and the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissals of actions
brought in federal court to enjoin, at their outset, SEC administrative enforcement proceedings on the grounds that the proceedings allegedly violated constitutional rights. 81
Public relations company exposure for helping issuer increase investor interest. SEC v.
Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc. demonstrates the dangers of providing public relations services to an issuer for the purpose of stimulating trading in the issuer's
stock. 82 Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc. ("Big Apple") and its subsidiaries sold
public relations and investor relations services to small companies. 83 As part of
its work, Big Apple "operated a telephone call room that contacted registered securities brokers and dealers to disseminate public information in order to create
interest in client companies and their stock "84 One Big Apple subsidiary contracted to provide services to CyberKey Solutions, Inc. ("CyberKey"), with the
Big Apple subsidiary specifically committing to "diligently market and promote
[CyberKey] to brokers
and [ ] introduce [CyberKey] and its principals to
[the Big Apple subsidiary's] current and future network of brokerage firms and
market makers." 85 CyberKey paid the Big Apple subsidiary with CyberKey
stock, and the subsidiary purchased options on additional CyberKey shares. 86
This arrangement was typical for Big Apple, as ninety-five percent of its clients
paid with stock. 87

77. Id. at 524 ("[W]e therefore hold that Zauderer has no application to this case.").
78. Id. at 527-30; see id. at 524 ("Even if ... Zauderer governed the analysis, we still believe that
the statute and the regulations violate the First Amendment.").
79. Id. at 530.
80. See infra notes 82-129 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 130-62 and accompanying text.
82. 783 F.3d 786 (11th Cir. 2015)
83. Id. at 790.
84. Id. at 791.
85. Id. (quoting contract). Although CyberKey contracted with one Big Apple subsidiary, the parties understood that Big Apple and its subsidiaries would provide the services. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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CyberKey falsely told Big Apple that CyberKey had valuable contracts with
U.S. government agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security
("DHS"). 88 In late 2005, the CyberKey CEO gave a contract to Big Apple principals, claiming that it documented the transaction with DHS. 8 g While the Big
Apple principals did not look at the contract closely, the contract showed obvious signs of fraud-with the counterparty identified in several places as the State
of Connecticut, rather than DHS, and with the contract award date specified differently on different pages of the document.go Nevertheless, Big Apple and a subsidiary publicized the supposed DHS contract through press releases, some of
which announced that CyberKey had shipped product to DHS and received
two $4.2 million payments from that government agency.g 1
In January 2006, CyberKey provided a financial statement to one of the Big
Apple principals showing only $6,000 in cash, despite CyberKey having supposedly received the first payment of $4.2 million from DHS, and CyberKey subsequently failed to engage an outside auditor to review its financials, despite urging from the Big Apple principal to do so.g 2 In the summer of 2006, a vice
president of a Big Apple subsidiary prepared a memorandum that listed various
"broken promises" by CyberKey.g 3 In August 2006, a DHS official contacted a
Big Apple subsidiary to say that he could not locate the purchase order referred
to in a CyberKey press release.g 4 The SEC eventually sued the CyberKey CEO,
who was also indicted and convicted of securities fraud.gs
Over the course of its relationship with CyberKey, Big Apple and one of its
subsidiaries sold some 720 million shares of CyberKey stock for about $7.8 million.g6 The Big Apple companies never disclosed to investors or brokers that Big
Apple was being paid in CyberKey stock.g 7
The SEC sued Big Apple, two subsidiaries, and individuals associated with the Big
Apple companies.gs The district court granted summary judgment to the SEC on
claims that (i) Big Apple, a subsidiary, and an individual defendant violated section
5 of the Securities Act; (ii) Big Apple and a subsidiary violated section lS(a) of the
Exchange Act, which requires that brokers and dealers register with the SEC; and
(iii) two individual defendants aided and abetted the violations of section lS(a).gg
A jury then found that Big Apple, both subsidiary defendants, and the related individuals had violated section l 7(a) of the Securities Act and found that they also
aided and abetted CyberKey's violations of Rule lOb-srno
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.

at 792.

at 793.

at
at
at
at
at

794.
793-94.
792-93.
790, 794.
794.
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In affirming the resulting judgment, 101 the Eleventh Circuit provided four
holdings worth noting here. First, the court rejected the defendants' argument
that they "did not have ultimate authority over the content of CyberKey's
press releases," so that, under ]anus, "they could not be considered 'makers' of
any material misstatements and thus could not be liable under the provisions
of § l 7(a), which they assert[ed] are 'largely coextensive in scope' to those of
Rule lOb-5." 102 The court observed that section l 7(a)(2) "renders it 'unlawful
for any person in the offer or sale of any securities ... to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a
material fact,"' which, to the court, "'suggest[ed] ... it is irrelevant for purposes
of liability whether the seller uses his own false statement or one made by another
individual."' 103 Thus, the ]anus ruling 104 on who "makes" a statement for purpose
of Rule 1Ob-5(b)-which prohibits the "mak[ing]" of untrue statements in connection with securities transactions-does not apply to section l 7(a)(2). 105 Further,
subsections (a)(l) and (a)(3) of section 17 do not contain the word "make" and
"are in no way directly or indirectly affected by the ]anus decision." 106
In its second noteworthy holding, the Eleventh Circuit addressed aiding and
abetting. At the time of the violations, Exchange Act section 20(e) permitted the
SEC to bring aiding and abetting claims against "any person who 'knowingly
provides substantial assistance' to a primary violator of the Exchange Act." 107
The Dodd-Frank Act amended the provision so that it now permits the SEC
to bring such claims against "any person that knowingly or recklessly provides
substantial assistance" to such a violator. 108 The defendants argued that, because
their conduct took place before the amendment, the SEC had to prove that the
defendants charged with aiding and abetting had "'actual knowledge' of CyberKey's and [its CEO's] violations of§ lO(b) and Rule lOb-5." 109 The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the history of section 20(e) and concluded that-before the DoddFrank Act-the Eleventh Circuit and "[e]very other circuit to consider the issue .
acknowledged that severe recklessness could suffice" for aiding and abetting liabil101. Id. at 814.
102. Id. at 795. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012) ("obtain money or property by means of any
untrue statement"), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2015) (" ... make any untrue statement ... "). In Janus
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011), the Court held that, "[f]or
purposes of Rule 10b-5[(b)], the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority
over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it."
103. Big Apple, 783 F.3d at 796-97 (first quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added
by the court); and then quoting SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 127 (1st Cir. 2008)). In the Tambone
case, the First Circuit granted en bane review of the panel opinion and withdrew that opinion. See
SEC v. Tambone, 573 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2009). Thereafter, the First Circuit, sitting en bane, reinstated
the panel's analysis of section l 7(a)(2) of the Securities Act. See SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 4 36, 450
(1st Cir. 2010) (en bane).
104. See supra note 102.
105. Big Apple, 783 F.3d at 797.
106. Id. at 796; see id. at 797-98 (quotation from 798).
107. Id. at 798 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000)).
108. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 9290, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)
(2012)) (emphasis added to show amendment).
109. Big Apple, 783 F.3d at 798.
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ityuo Congress amended the statute to add the words "or recklessly" to codify
those judicial holdings and to correct lower court decisions that held otherwise. 111
Because recklessness therefore sufficed, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's summary judgment against individual defendants for aiding and abetting
Big Apple's failure to register as a broker/dealer, as the lower court had found
that those defendants "were at least severely reckless in providing substantial assistance to Big Apple's and [its subsidiary's] § lS(a) violations." 112 The court of appeals similarly held that the lower court properly instructed the jury "that it
could find that the defendants acted 'knowingly' for purposes of§ 20(e) if the defendants 'knew or were severely reckless in not knowing that [CyberKey's CEO] and
CyberKey ... were fraudulently disseminating false statements that CyberKey had
obtained a $25 million DHS contract."' 113
The Eleventh Circuit's third significant holding approved a "deliberate ignorance" instruction that informed the jurors that they "may infer knowledge of
the existence of a fact if a [d]efendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of that fact and purposely contrived to avoid learning [it]." 114 The instruction added that, "[i] f you find by a preponderance of the evidence that a
[d]efendant intentionally avoided knowledge or enlightenment, you may find
that [d] efendant acted knowingly or recklessly." 115 After noting that the Supreme Court has approved use of "deliberate ignorance" instructions in civil
cases, 116 the court of appeals rejected a defense argument that the instruction
improperly deviated from the Eleventh Circuit pattern instruction by failing to
tell the jury that it could not find that a defendant was deliberately ignorant
of a fact if the defendant "actually believed" that the fact did not exist. 117 The
appellate court reasoned that the instruction's focus on intentionally avoiding
knowledge was sufficient because "a defendant who did not actually believe
there was fraud would not be 'intentionally avoid [ing] knowledge or enlightenment' because he would have nothing to believe he was avoiding." 118
Fourth and finally, the Big Apple decision affirmed the summary judgment
against Big Apple, a subsidiary, and an individual for violating section 5 of the
Securities Act, which prohibits the interstate sale of securities unless the sale occurs pursuant to an effective registration statement or unless the sale is exempt
from registration. 119 Conceding that the SEC proved its prima facie case by
showing that Big Apple sold millions of shares of CyberKey stock in unregistered
110. Id. at 800 (collecting cases).
111. Id. at 799-801.
112. Id. at 798 (quoting district court).
113. Id. (quoting jury instruction) (emphasis added by appellate court). Moreover, the jury had
expressly found that the defendants "acted both with actual knowledge and with severe recklessness."
Id. at 801.
114. Id. at 803 (quoting jury instruction) (first alteration by appellate court).
115. Id. at 803-04 (quoting jury instruction) (second and third alterations by appellate court).
116. Id. at 802-03 (citing Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2069
(2011))
117. Id. at 804-05 (quoting pattern jury instruction).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 806-10.
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transactions, the defendants claimed that they had proved the sales fell within
section 4(a)(l) of the Securities Act, which exempts "transactions by any person
other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." 120 The Eleventh Circuit held that
this exemption did not apply because the district court properly determined that
the defendants were "underwriters" and that Big Apple and its subsidiary were
"dealers." 121
The Securities Act defines "underwriter" to include "any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection
with, the distribution of any security." 122 The definition focuses on "investment
intent at the time of acquisition," with a rule of thumb "that a two-year holding
period is sufficient to negate the inference that the security holder did not acquire the securities with a 'view to distribute."' 123 While the defendants claimed
they had held CyberKey stock for six months and "maybe even longer," that
holding period fell short of the two years that would negate an inference of purchase for distribution. 124 Moreover, evidence presented by the SEC showed acquisitions and sales very close in time. 125 While the defendants argued that they
took CyberKey stock in payment for services, the court found that fact to reinforce the conclusion that they were underwriters, as it was "difficult to fathom
how Big Apple could operate by receiving stock not with a 'view toward' distribution in order to maintain its own operating costs." 126
The Securities Act defines a "dealer" to include "any person who engages either
for all or part of his time, directly or indirectly, . . in the business of offering,
buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another
person. "127 Big Apple and its subsidiaries fell comfortably into this definition
as their "entire business model was predicated on the . . sale of securities" received from clients in exchange for services provided by Big Apple. 128
Significance and analysis. Beyond showing how tricky it is to stay on the right
side of the law when providing public relations services to companies for the
purpose of raising their profile with investors and brokers, Big Apple provides
a rare decision on the statutory exemption provided by section 4(a)(l) of the Securities Act. In doing so, the opinion demonstrates the continuing vitality of the

120. Id. at 807 (quoting 15 USC. § 77d(a)(l) (2012))
121. Id. at 807-10.
122. 15 USC.§ 77b(a)(ll) (2012)
123. Big Apple, 783 F.3d at 807 (citations omitted).
124. Id. (quoting defendants).
125. Id. at 808 (citing the acquisition-and, within one month, the sale-of 300 million shares
and the acquisition-and, on the same day, the sale-of 6 million shares).
126. Id. The defendants pointed to the six-month holding period in Rule 144. Id. at 809 (citing 17
C.F.R. § 230.l 44(d) (2015)). The court, however, declined to read that holding period into the statutory exemption provided by section 4(a)(l), as the defendants did not otherwise qualify for Rule
144 protection. Id.
127. 15 USC. § 77b(a)(l2) (2012)
128. Big Apple, 783 F.3d at 809.
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two-year holding period rule of thumb. 129 The decision also illustrates the problems facing any services provider-whether a public relations firm or law firm or
other-that takes stock as compensation, where the sale of the stock is consistently necessary to satisfy the service provider's cash flow needs.
Timing of challenges to SEC choice to proceed by administrative enforcement. The
SEC may bring an enforcement action either in federal district court or in an administrative proceeding before one of the SEC's administrative law judges
("ALJs")no Two circuit courts held, in 2015, that respondents in administrative
proceedings could not challenge the SEC's decisions to proceed in that forum by
suing in federal court before the administrative proceedings ran their course.
In the first case, the Commission filed an administrative proceeding against
George Jarkesy, Jr. and the investment advisory firm he headed, also naming
as respondents a broker-dealer and another individual defendant-alleging violations of the Exchange Act, the Securities Act, the Investment Advisers Act, and
the Investment Company Act. 131 After the broker-dealer and the other individual settled and the SEC issued an order that both approved that settlement and
included "findings" that were not binding on Mr. Jarkesy or his advisory firm,
but implicated them, Mr. Jarkesy and his advisory firm filed an action in federal
court seeking an injunction to prevent the SEC from continuing with the administrative proceeding against them. 132 They alleged that the continuation of that
proceeding would violate their (i) Fifth Amendment due process rights because
the SEC had prejudged them by the findings it made in approving the settlement
with the other respondents; (ii) equal protection rights because they were denied
a right to a jury trial (which they would have had if the Commission had proceeded in federal court); and (iii) equal protection rights because the SEC pursued them out of animus. 133 They also contended that the SEC administrative
proceeding should be stopped because the Commission had (iv) violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") by engaging in ex parte communications
with the settling respondents; and (v) failed to provide discovery that the SEC
was required by its own rules to produce. 134
Affirming the district court's dismissal of the case 135 on the ground that the
statutory scheme for administrative proceedings "implicitly precluded concurrent district-court jurisdiction over challenges like Jarkesy's," 136 the D.C. Circuit
employed the analysis set out in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich. 137 This analysis
required Mr. Jarkesy to "proceed exclusively through [the] statutory scheme of
129. 1 LOUIS Loss ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECUR!TlES REGULATION 568 (6th ed. 2011) (tracing the
two-year presumption back to comments made by SEC Commissioner Manuel F. Cohen in the
1960s)
130 15 USC. §§ 78u(d), 78u-2, 78u-3 (2012)
131. jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 14.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 12, 30.
136. Id. at 12.
137. Id. at 15 (citing Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207 (1994)).
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administrative and judicial review when (i) [a congressional] intent [that the
respondent do so] is 'fairly discernible in the statutory scheme,' and (ii) the litigant's claims are 'of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within [the] statutory structure."' 138
Turning to the first prong of the analysis, the court of appeals found the requisite intent because the securities statutes provided a "comprehensive structure
for the adjudication of securities violations in administrative proceedings," including Commission review of ALJ decisions followed by the opportunity to
seek review of an adverse Commission decision in a federal court of appeals. 139
By statute, Congress left the choice of forum to the SEC, and the Commission's
right to make its choice "could be for naught if respondents like Jarkesy could
countermand the Commission's choice by filing a court action." 140
The appellate court then divided the second prong of the analysis into three
factors: (i) whether the judicial review provided by statute to Mr. Jarkesy was
"meaningful"; (ii) whether his attack through his federal court action was
"wholly collateral" to his administrative proceeding; and (iii) whether his federal
court claims were outside the SECs area of expertise. 141 As to the first factor, the
court rejected Mr. Jarkesy's contention that judicial review was not meaningful
because the SEC could not adjudicate constitutional challenges to the statutes
that permitted the administrative proceeding, reasoning that his "constitutional
claims ... can eventually reach 'an Article Ill court fully competent to adjudicate'
them." 142 Nor was Mr. Jarkesy deprived of a meaningful review because he had
to go through a costly administrative proceeding to get to a court of appeals
because-unlike a litigant who had to break a law that he or she would not otherwise break in order to generate a controversy to raise a constitutional questionMr. Jarkesy was "already properly before the Commission by virtue of his alleged
violations." 143 Moreover, the review was not without meaning because the ALJ had
denied Mr. Jarkesy's requests for discovery to prove some of his claims, as an appeals court could always remand the matter to the SEC for further factual development, if necessary. 144
As to the second factor, Mr. Jarkesy's claims were not "wholly collateral" to his
administrative proceeding because several of them-such as that the Commission had (i) prejudged his case by making non-binding findings against him
in the order settling with other respondents, (ii) violated the APA through ex
parte communications with the other respondents during settlement with
them, and (iii) failed to provide required discovery-were "inextricably intertwined with the conduct of the very enforcement proceeding the statute grants

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
14 3.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207, 212) (last alteration by D.C. Circuit).
at 16-17.
at 17.
(quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212-13).
at 19 (quoting Elgin v. Dep't of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2137 (2012)).
at 20.
at 22.
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the SEC the power to institute and resolve as an initial matter." 145 The D.C. Circuit declined to parse the claims finely in order to create collateral issues because
doing so would produce ambiguous analysis that "would encourage respondents
in administrative enforcement proceedings to frame their challenges [in ways to
conform to any 'collateral' issues a close analysis might conjure] ... and thereby
earn access to another forum in which to advance their arguments." 146
Turning to the third factor of the second prong of the Thunder Basin analysis,
the court granted that the SEC might not have special expertise in certain of the
constitutional issues Jarkesy raised, but found that the Commission was fully capable of addressing such matters as whether the settlement with the other respondents prejudiced Mr. Jarkesy and his other attacks on the fairness of the
proceeding. 147 Moreover, if the administrative proceeding resolved in Mr. Jarkesy's
favor, the constitutional claims could be avoided, and even if not, the Commission
might interpret the securities laws in such a way that would "answer or shed light
on" those claims. 148
Resolving both prongs of the Thunder Basin analysis against him, the D.C. Circuit held "that the securities laws provide an exclusive avenue for judicial review
that Jarkesy may not bypass by filing suit in district court." 149
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar result, albeit with a less rigorous analysis, in Bebo v. SEC. 150 The SEC brought an administrative enforcement proceeding against Laurie Bebo, alleging that, while CEO, she had manipulated internal
records at her company, lied to auditors, and made false disclosures to the Commission.151 Before the ALJ entered an initial decision, Ms. Bebo sued in federal
court, alleging that the provision of the Dodd-Frank Act that authorized the SEC
to initiate administrative actions against persons who are not registered with the
SEC in the securities business 152 is unconstitutional "because it provides the SEC
'unguided' authority to choose which respondents will and which will not receive the procedural protections of a federal district court, in violation of
equal protection and due process guarantees." 153 She also argued that, because
the ALJs presiding in the administrative proceedings are insulated from removal
by the president "by multiple layers of for-cause protection," the proceedings
"interfere[] with the President's [Article II] obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws." 154 As in]arhesy, the district court dismissed the federal court
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed. 155

145. Id. at 23 (quoting jarkesy v. SEC, 48 F. Supp. 3d 32, 38 (D.D.C. 2014)).
146. Id. at 25.
147. Id. at 28.
148. Id. at 29.
149. Id. at 30.
150. 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 84 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2016) (No. 15-997).
151. Id. at 767.
152. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862-64 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-2 (2012))
153. Bebo, 799 F.3d at 768.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 768, 775.
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The Seventh Circuit, however, keyed its analysis to Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 156 which the court found to focus on the
three factors in the second prong of the Thunder Basin analysis. 157 The court held
that the question of whether Ms. Bebo had available "meaningful judicial review"
was the "most critical," and that Ms. Bebo had such review because, as she was
"already the respondent in a pending enforcement proceeding," she could,
"[a] fter the pending enforcement action has run its course,
. raise her objections in a circuit court of appeals established under Article Ill." 158 Being already
embroiled in an enforcement proceeding involuntarily, she did "not need to risk
incurring a sanction voluntarily just to bring her constitutional challenges before
a court of competent jurisdiction." 159 With this "most important" factor weighing against her, it did not matter whether her constitutional claims were "wholly
collateral" to her administrative proceeding or not, 160 and jurisdiction did "not
turn on whether the SEC has authority to hold [the relevant section of the DoddFrank Act] unconstitutional, nor [did] it hinge on whether Bebo's constitutional
challenges fall outside the agency's expertise." 161
Echoing the concern voiced by the D.C. Circuit, the Seventh Circuit worried that
a contrary holding would mean that "[e]very person hoping to enjoin an ongoing
administrative proceeding could make [Ms. Bebo's] argument," and returned, at the
end of the opinion to the first Thunder Basin prong, saying that it found "no evidence from the statute's text, structure, and purpose that Congress intended for
plaintiffs like Bebo who are already subject to ongoing administrative enforcement
proceedings to be able to stop those proceedings by challenging the constitutionality of the enabling legislation or the structural authority of the SEC. "162
PROXY SOLICITATION

Ordinary business exception to shareholder's right to use company proxy for shareholder resolution. Exchange Act Rule l 4a-8 provides that a registered shareholder
of a public company-who has continuously held at least $2,000 worth, or at
least one percent, of the company's voting securities for at least one year-can
submit a proposal to be considered at the company's annual meeting of shareholders and further provides that the "company must include [that] proposal
156. Id. at 768-69 (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477
(2010))
157. Id. at 769. The court of appeals also relied on Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 132 S. Ct.
2126, 2135-36, 2140 (2012), for the rule that a facial constitutional challenge to an administrative
hearing scheme does not automatically entitle a respondent in an administrative proceeding to "seek
judicial review in ... district court," Bebo, 799 F.3d at 771, and the rule "that jurisdiction does not
turn on whether the SEC has authority to hold§ 929P(a) of Dodd-Frank unconstitutional," id. at 773.
158. Bebo, 799 F.3d at 774.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 772-73 (citing Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2140).
162. Id. at 775. In one other noteworthy decision, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the SEC that the
requirement for the Division of Enforcement to file a proceeding within 180 days of serving a Wells
notice is not jurisdictional, and therefore the violation of that time limit does not require dismissal of
the late-filed proceeding. Montford & Co. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76, 81-83 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in its form of proxy when the
company holds an annual or special meeting of shareholders." 163 The company's
proxy statement must also include the shareholder's argument in support of
the proposal, but the proposal itself and the supporting argument cannot exceed
500 words. 164
The company, however, can exclude a proposal from its proxy materials if any
of a number of exceptions apply. 165 One exception permits the company to exclude a shareholder's proposal from its proxy materials if "the proposal deals
with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations" 166 (the
"Ordinary Business Operations Exclusion"). Another exception permits the company to exclude a proposal from its proxy materials if the "proposal or supporting statement is contrary to any of the Commission's proxy rules." 167 Proposals
can be excluded on this ground when they "are 'so vague and ambiguous that the
issuer and security holders would not be able to determine what action the proposal is contemplating"' 168 (the "Vague and Ambiguous Exclusion").
Trinity Wall Street ("Trinity"), an Episcopal parish, submitted a proposal to
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart") for inclusion in Wal-Mart's proxy materials
for its 2014 annual shareholder meeting. 169 Trinity's proposal requested that
the directors amend the charter of the board's Compensation, Nominating and
Governance Committee to add to its duties:
Providing oversight concerning [and the public reporting of1 the formulation and
implementation of . . policies and standards that determine whether or not the
Company should sell a product that:
1) especially endangers public safety and well-being;
2) has the substantial potential to impair the reputation of the Company; and/or
3) would reasonably be considered by many offensive to the family and community
values integral to the Company's promotion of its brand. 170

Trinity's supporting statement said that the oversight would include "policies
and standards that would be applicable to [(i)] determining whether or not
the company should sell guns equipped with magazines holding more than
ten rounds of ammunition,
and [(ii)] balancing the benefits of selling
such guns against the risks that these sales pose to the public and to the Company's reputation and brand value." 171

163. 17 CFR. § 240.14a-8 (2015)
164. Id. § 240 l 4a-8(d)
165. Id.§ 240.14a-8(i) (listing thirteen bases for exclusion).
166. Id. § 240 l 4a-8(i)(7)
167. Id. § 240 l 4a-8(i)(3)
168. Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 355 (3d Cir. 2015) (Shwartz,]., concurring) (quoting Proposed Amendments to Rule l 4a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, 1982 WL
600869, at *13 (Oct. 14, 1982)).
169. Id. at 328 (majority opinion). judge Ambro authored the opinion of the court, and was joined
by judge Vanaskie. Id. at 326.
170. Id. at 329-30 (quoting proposal) (alteration by court).
171. Id. at 330 (quoting proposal).
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In January 2014, Wal-Mart informed Trinity and the SECs Division of Corporate Finance that Wal-Mart believed that the proposal fell within the Ordinary
Business Operations Exclusion. 172 In March 2014, the SEC staff issued a "noaction" letter to Wal-Mart, stating that the staff would not recommend an enforcement action against the company if it excluded Trinity's proposal from its proxy
materials. 173 Trinity sued in federal court for a declaration that Wal-Mart's decision to exclude the proposal violated Rule l 4a-8, seeking both a preliminary and
permanent injunction to prevent Wal-Mart from excluding the proposal. 174 The
district court denied the preliminary injunction on the basis that the Ordinary
Business Operations Exclusion applied. 175 However, because the district court
concluded that the case was not moot after the 2014 shareholder meeting because the complaint reasonably anticipated a 2015 violation, 176 the lower
court proceeded with the case and ruled on summary judgment in Trinity's
favor, concluding that the Ordinary Business Operations Exclusion did not
apply.177
The Third Circuit reversed the district court, 178 with (i) an opinion of the
court, authored by two judges, who concluded-on an elaborate analysisthat the Ordinary Business Operations Exemption applied, 179 and (ii) a concurring opinion by the third judge, who (a) also concluded-but on a more truncated analysis-that the Ordinary Business Operations Exemption applied, 180
and (b) further concluded, joined by a member of the majority, that the
Vague and Ambiguous Exclusion applied. 181 The majority found that the "subject matter" of Trinity's proposal was not corporate governance through board
oversight of strategic matters, such as community responsibility and reputation,
but that "[t]he subject matter of the proposal [was] instead its ultimate consequence-here a potential change in the way Wal-Mart decides which products
to sell." 182 That subject matter was "at the core of Wal-Mart's business" because
"[a] retailer's approach to its product offerings is the bread and butter of its business." 183 Thus, the proposal "relate [d]" to Wal-Mart's ordinary business. 184
The majority, however, recognized that the SEC staff takes the view that the
Ordinary Business Operations Exclusion generally does not apply if "a proposal's
underlying subject matter transcends the day-to-day business matters of the
company and raises policy issues so significant that it would be appropriate
172. Id. at 330-31.
173. Id. at 331.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 332.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 328.
179. Id. at 340-51.
180. Id. at 351-54 (Shwartz, ]., concurring).
181. Id. at 355. judge Vanaskie joined this part of the concurrence. See id. at 351, 355.
182. Id. at 342 (majority opinion).
183. Id. at 344.
184. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 240. l 4a-8(i)(7) (2015) (stating that shareholder proposal may be excluded
if it "deals with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations" (emphasis added)).
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for a shareholder vote." 185 The majority conceded that the Trinity proposal "raise[d]
a matter of sufficiently significant policy." 186 The policy, however, did not transcend Wal-Mart's ordinary business operations because "the essence of a retailer's business is deciding what products to put on its shelves-decisions made
daily that involve a careful balancing of financial, marketing, reputational, competitive and other factors." 187 Pointing to a series of no-action letters in which
the SEC staff concluded that the Ordinary Business Operations Exclusion applied to shareholder proposals designed to force retailers to stop selling or promoting products that "pose a threat to public health," the majority found that
Trinity's proposal "targets the same basic business decision: how to weigh safety
risks in the merchandising calculus." 188 The majority further found that "WalMart's consideration of the risk that certain products pose to its 'economic success' and 'reputation for good corporate citizenship' is enmeshed with the way it
runs its business and the retailer-consumer interaction." 189 In short, "[f] or a policy issue here to transcend Wal-Mart's business operations, it must target something more than the choosing of one among tens of thousands of products it
sells," and Trinity's proposal "fail[ed] that test." 190
The concurring judge (alone) thought that this analysis went too far and
"practically gives companies carte blanche to exclude any proposal raising social
policy issues that are directly related to core business operations." 191 She concluded, however, that the first component of Trinity's proposal-which was
not phrased specifically in terms of high-capacity weapons, but instead referred
broadly to "public safety," implicating "thousands of goods"-was not sufficiently focused to raise a "significant social policy." 192 The second and third
components of Trinity's proposal-which related to potential harm to WalMart's reputation and whether its products might offend family and community
values-could also "cover many products" and, in addition, were matters of concern to the company and its shareholders but did "not present a social policy
issue." 193
The concurring judge (joined by one member of the majority) also found that
Wal-Mart could exclude Trinity's proposal from its proxy materials because the
Vague and Ambiguous Exclusion applied. 194 Focusing on the third set of policies Trinity demanded-regarding "the sale of products that 'would reasonably
be considered by many to be offensive to the family and community values in185. Trinity Wall St., 792 F.3d at 345 (quoting SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E, 2009 WL
4363205, at *2 (Oct. 27, 2009)).
186. Id. at 346.
187. Id. at 348.
188. Id. at 348-50.
189. Id. at 350. The majority observed that the outcome might have been different if such a proposal had been submitted to a company that manufactured a very narrow range of products, unlike
retailers that "typically deal with thousands of products amid many options for each." Id. at 349.
190. Id. at 351.
191. Id. at 353 (Shwartz,]., concurring).
192. Id. at 354.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 355. judge Vanaskie joined this part of the concurrence. See id. at 351, 355.
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tegral to' Wal-Mart's brand"-the concurrence found that "th[o]se buzz words
fail[ed] to provide any concrete guidance as to what constitutes 'many' or
what 'family values' should be considered." 195 Accordingly, the proposal did
"not inform the shareholders of the breadth of the subject on which they
would be asked to vote nor [did] it make clear what the Company would be required to do if it were adopted." 196
FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

Federal securities law defines forward-looking statements to include financial
projections and forecasts of future economic performance, management's plans
and objectives for future operations, and related or underlying assumptions. 197
With important exceptions not relevant to decisions discussed below, both the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act provide two protections, from liability in
private lawsuits, for forward-looking statements made by issuers filing reports
pursuant to Exchange Act sections 13(a) or lS(d), and the officers and other
agents of those issuers. 198 First, to establish liability, a plaintiff must prove
that a forward-looking statement was made with "actual knowledge
that
[it] was false or misleading." 199 Second, if an issuer accompanies a forwardlooking statement with "meaningful cautionary [language] identifying important
factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forwardlooking statement," then neither the issuer nor anyone acting on its behalf can be
liable on the statement in a private action at all. 20 Cautionary language accompanies an oral forward-looking statement for this purpose if the oral statement refers
to "a readily available written document" that contains the warnings, with SEC filings being "readily available" for this purpose. 201
Two decisions interpreted these protections in 2015. The D.C. Circuit held
that cautions accompanying forward-looking statements about inventory were
not meaningful where they did not disclose that the issuer was holding obsolete
inventory that would be hard to sell without heavy discounting. 202 The Eighth
Circuit held that an issuer's statements regarding government-protected product
exclusivity were forward-looking even though phrased in the present tense and
that the accompanying cautions were meaningful, in a case where the government ultimately exercised its discretion against enforcing the exclusivity. 203

°

195. Id. (quoting proposal).
196. Id. In another notable section l 4(a) case, the Sixth Circuit found that communications by a fired
CEO to shareholders that effectively urged shareholders to revoke proxies given to management-but
that did not ask shareholders to give proxies to the CEO-were exempt from the SEC rules requiring
that proxy solicitations be filed with the SEC and include the content that SEC rules prescribe. Gas
Nat. Inc. v. Osborne, 624 F. App'x 944, 952-55 (6th Cir. 2015).
197. 15 USC§§ 77z-2(i)(l), 78u-5(i)(l) (2012)
198. Id. §§ 77z-2(a)-(c), 78u-5(a)-(c)
199. Id. §§ 77z-2(c)(l)(B), 78u-5(c)(l)(B)
200. Id. §§ 77z-2(c)(l)(A), 78u-5(c)(l)(A)
201. Id. §§ 77z-2(c)(2)-(3), 78u-5(c)(2)-(3)(B)
202. See infra notes 204-29 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 230-50 and accompanying text.
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Forward-looking statements, about growth and expansion and planned reduction in
product inventory, made without disclosing that the inventory was obsolete. By the time
In re Harman International Industries, Inc. Securities Litigation reached the D.C. Circuit, only three statements remained in the Rule lOb-5 action that the plaintiffs
brought against the issuer defendant and three officers, 204 with two of those
statements treated as "forward-looking statements" for purpose of the appeal. 205
The issuer manufactured a variety of products, including personal navigation devices ("PNDs"). 206 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants committed fraud by
making the two forward-looking statements without also telling investors that the
company was stuck with a large inventory of obsolete PNDs that could not be
sold except at low prices. 207 In the first statement, the CEO, on April 26, 2007,
reminded listeners that the company had said three months earlier that "PND inventories in Europe had grown substantially"; noted that the company had, at that
time, said that it "planned to reduce [inventory] to normal levels at year-end";
added that this "plan is proceeding"; projected sales of 618,000 PND units
by the end of the year; and forecasted reductions of inventory from $75 million
at the end of March to $50 million by the end of April, $30 million at the end
of May, and $15 million by the end of June. 208 In the second statement, the
chief financial officer ("CFO"), on September 27, 2007, predicted "a very strong
first quarter [for Fiscal Year ('FY') 2008], ... reflecting ... [in part] the PND business, where we continue the growth and expansion of that business primarily in
Europe." 209
Before addressing whether the cautionary language accompanying those statements shielded the defendants from liability, the D.C. Circuit defined "meaningful" cautions-for purposes of the forward-looking statutory protection-to
be "'substantive company-specific warnings based on a realistic description of
the risks applicable to the particular circumstances'" that are "tailored to the
forward-looking statement that it accompanies." 210 The court held that cautions
"cannot be 'meaningful' if [they are] 'misleading in light of historical fact[s] ."' 211
Although the cautions need not mention the particular risk that later matures
and frustrates realization of the forward-looking statement, "Congress required
that a company must warn of factors that '[h]av[e] much import or significance'
and 'carry[] with [them] great or serious consequences,' and which are 'likely to

204. 791 F.3d 90, 94-96 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 84 U.S.L.W. 3307 (U.S. Feb. 29, 2016)
(No 15-694)
205. The plaintiffs asserted on appeal that those statements did not fit within the statutory definition of "forward-looking statements," 15 U.S.C. § 78u-S(i)(l), but the court of appeals ruled the
plaintiffs had forfeited that contention. Harman, 791 F.3d at 100.
206. Harman, 791 F.3d at 95.
207. Id. at 97-98.
208. Id. at 96-97 (quoting CEO's statements to analysts).
209. Id. at 98 (quoting CFO's statements to analysts).
210. Id. at 102 (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 372 (5th
Cir. 2004))
211. Id. (quoting Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758, 770 (2d Cir. 2010)).
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have a profound effect on success."' 212 "[M]ere boilerplate ... does not meet the
statutory standard because by its nature it is general and ubiquitous, not tailored
to the specific circumstances of a business operation," 213 and language that
"remain[s] unchanged despite a significant change in circumstances of material
importance to an investor" will not do. 214
Armed with these principles, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal, which rested on the determination that Harman's cautionary language insulated the two forward-looking statements from a private Rule lOb-5 claimns
Turning to the first statement, made in a conference call on April 26, 2007, the
defendants argued that cautions in the company's Annual Report on Form 10-K
("10-K") for the fiscal year 2006-to which the moderator of the conference call
referred listeners-said that "PND 'inventories ... had grown substantially,' increasing to approximately $50 million." 216 In addition, the 10-K "stated sales
could suffer if the Company failed to 'develop, introduce and achieve market acceptance of new and enhanced products,' that it had to 'maintain and improve
existing products, while successfully developing and introducing new products,'
and could 'experience difficulties that delay or prevent the development, introduction or market acceptance of new or enhanced products,' as well as that competitors could 'introduce superior designs or business strategies, impairing [the
Company's] distinctive image and [its] products' desirability."' 217 Those warnings, however, were not "meaningful" (at least when reviewed on a motion to
dismiss) "because they were misleading in light of historical fact"-i.e., "they
did not warn of actual obsolescence that had already manifested itself," 218 and
that would make the amassed inventory hard to sell. The plaintiffs successfully
pled that manifestation by alleging that (i) Harman had modified the PND design
in early 2007, making its older versions obsolete; (ii) the company had missed its
2006 PND sales target and was storing units in a warehouse; and (iii) the sales
team had discussed price reductions in order to remain competitiven 9
The defendants pointed to the general rule that a company does not need to
disclose what investors already know-here that technical devices obsolesce as
new, more advanced products arrive on the market. 220 The court brushed this
argument aside for the same reason it rejected the cautionary statements included in the 10-K; the general principle did not mean that investors knew, at
the time of the first statement, that Harman's PND inventory was already obso-

212. Id. at 103 (quoting, in the first and second instances, 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 728 (2d
ed. 1989); then quoting NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 849 (2d ed. 2005) (citations omitted)).
213. Id. at 102.
214. Id. at 107.
215. Id. at 95, 112.
216. Id. at 104 (quoting 10-K). Harman's fiscal year ended on June 30, so the pertinent 10-K was
filed in September 2006. See Harman Int'! Indus., Inc., 10-K (Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/800459/000080045906000077/0000800459-06-000077-index.htm.
217. Harman, 791 F.3d at 103-04 (quoting 10-K) (alteration by court).
218. Id. at 104.
219. Id.
220 Id.
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leten 1 As to the first statement's reference to a "plan" to reduce inventory by
selling 618,000 PND units by the end of the year, that was "not a warning at
all, much less of obsolescence. "222
Moving to the second forward-looking statement, on September 27, 2007, the
court reached the same conclusionn 3 The cautionary statements on which defendants relied to protect that statement appeared in the company's "FY 2007 [10-K],
which repeated the general warnings in the FY 2006 [10-K]." 224 By September 27,
plaintiffs alleged, (i) Harman had agreed in June to sell 100,000 PNDs for $240
per unit, not the ordinary price of $350; (ii) the company had missed its FY 2007
projected PND sales by more than 200,000 units; and (iii), as told by an accounting manager, "had on hand hundreds of millions of dollars worth of obsolete
Generation 2 PNDs which were being superseded by newer Generation 3
PNDs in August 2007." 225 In the face of those pled facts, the court found that
warnings of "a generalized risk of obsolescence and the general effect that obsolescence could have on sales" were not "meaningful" but instead "misleading in
light of historical facts," because, by the time of the second statement, "there
was no longer a mere risk and some evidence of obsolescence, but rather an intractable problem of obsolescence was a reality that the Company failed to
disclose." 226
Significance and analysis. Harman suggests that, in order to obtain the protection in a case where the cautionary language does not address the particular factor that ultimately causes results to differ materially from those predicted in the
forward-looking statement, the cautionary language must warn of "factors that
'[h]av[e] much import or significance' and 'carry[] with [them] great or serious
consequences,' and which are 'likely to have a profound effect on success."' 227
Unfortunately, this definition of "meaningful" is so general as to provide virtually
no operational guidance. Harris v. Ivax Corporation, which Harman cites and
quotes, offers a more useful formulation, saying that warnings are sufficient,
even if they do not mention the particular risk that matured, if the cautions
"warned of risks of a significance similar to that actually realized. "228 Harman
may be best understood as addressing only the particular instance in which cautionary language points to the very risk that frustrates the forward-looking statement but the language is not "meaningful" because, at the time the defendants
make the statement, the risk has already materialized and the defendants do not
so disclose. 229
Forward-looking statements that federal agency would bring enforcement actions to
protect exclusivity of drug. K-V Pharmaceutical Company ("K-V") bought the
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 105.
at
at
at
at

106-08.
106.
106-07 (quoting complaint).
107.
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
182 F.3d 799, 807 (11th Cir. 1999), quoted in Harman, 791 F.3d at 103.
Harman, 791 F.3d at 108.
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rights to a drug to reduce pre-term labor in at-risk mothers. 23 K-V sought from
the FDA, and obtained, an exclusive right to sell the drug for seven years, under
the Orphan Drug Act, which is designed to stimulate the development and production of drugs to treat conditions affecting less than 200,000 persons in the
United States. 231 K-V stated in a conference call with investors on February 14,
2011, that (i) the FDA had granted the medication orphan drug status; (ii) K-V
planned to charge $1,500 per injection; (iii) insurers would pay for the drug because the cost of pre-term birth ($51,000) exceeded the total price for injections
during a pregnancy ($30,000); and (iv) K-V would offer financial assistance to patients with household incomes up to $100,000. 232
The K-V price marked a 14 ,900 percent increase from the price of the drug
when mixed by compounding pharmacies. 233 As to FDA action to enforce
K-V's exclusive right, the company stated during the February 14, 2011, conference call its belief "that the regulations and laws are very clear
that compounding pharmacies are not FDA-approved manufacturing facilities and that
FDA regulations and state pharmacy laws generally prohibit the distribution of
compounded products that are the same or essentially the same as FDAapproved products." 234 The company added its belief "that compounded pharmacies are aware of these laws and regulations, and our expectation is that they
will adhere to them." 235
On February 1 7, 2011, K-V sent letters to compounding pharmacies advising
them that they should not concoct the drug and warning them that that FDA enforcement action could follow if a compounding pharmacy produced the drug in
an unlicensed way. 236 On March 30, 2011, however, the FDA issued a statement
saying that, "[i]n order to support access to this important drug .
[the agency
did] not intend to take enforcement action against pharmacies that compound
[the chemical equivalent of the drug]. "237 In response, K-V announced that it
would reduce the price of the drug to $690 per injection. 238
The price of K-V stock dropped, 239 and the plaintiffs filed a Rule lOb-5 action
against K-V and three officers. 240 The Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court
judgment dismissing the case. 241 The court of appeals held that the challenged
230. julianello v. K-V Pharm. Co., 791F.3d915, 917 (8th Cir. 2015).
231. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee).
232. Id. at 918.
233. Id. "Compounding" is "a practice in which a licensed pharmacist, a licensed physician, or, in
the case of an outsourcing facility, a person under the supervision of a licensed pharmacist, combines, mixes, or alters ingredients of a drug to create a medication tailored to the needs of an individual patient." Compounding and the FDA- Questions and Answers, U.S. FoOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://
www. fda. gov /Dru gs/Guidance Compliance Regulatory Inf or ma tion/Pha rmacy Compounding/
ucm339764.htm#what (last updated Oct. 6, 2015).
234. K-V, 791 F.3d at 918 (quoting company comments during call).
235. Id. (quoting company comments during call).
236. Id. at 919.
237. Id. (quoting FDA's statement).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 916-17, 920 (expressly referring to Rule lOb-5).
241. Id. at 917, 920, 922, 923.
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representations fell within the portion of the statutory definition of forwardlooking statements that provides protection to any "statement of the plans and
objectives of management for future operations, including plans or objectives relating to the products or services of the issuer" 242 because the statements "detailed K-V's future launch of [the drug] and the anticipated results." 243 Even
though the statements-"that K-V felt the laws and regulations were clear and
that they anticipated that the FDA would enforce exclusivity once [the drug]
was launched"-were phrased in "the present tense," the use of the present
tense did "not undermine [the court's] determination that they were forwardlooking" because the statements were "tied to a future event[,] the launch of
[the drug]" and "[u]ntil th[at] future event occurred, it could not be determined
whether the FDA would vary from its usual practice of enforcing exclusivity." 244
The court thereby applied the principle that a statement in the present tense is
forward-looking if its "veracity ... [can] only be determined after [it is] made." 245
Having ruled that K-V's statements fell within the statutory definition of "forward looking," the Eighth Circuit went on to hold that the statute precluded a private Rule 1Ob-5 action on the statements because the company had accompanied
them with meaningful cautionary language. 246 The company had commenced the
February 14, 2011, conference call by saying that actual results could differ materially from those suggested by forward-looking statements made during the
call and that the uncertainties that might work this unhappy result included
those that K-V had identified as risk factors in its 10-K. 247 This was sufficient
under the Exchange Act to "accompany" the oral forward-looking statements in
the call by the cautionary language included in those risk factors. 248 In turn,
those risk factors advised that "any product launch may be delayed or unsuccessful, including with respect to Gestiva [the drug that was the subject of the case]";
and warned of "the possibility that any period of exclusivity may not be realized,
including with respect to Gestiva, a designated Orphan Drug." 249 The Eighth Circuit found these cautions "meaningful" because, far from being "boilerplate," they
"warned [investors] of precisely the risks about which [the plaintiffs] now complain" by "explicitly identif[ying] the risks associated with the FDA's presumed en-

242. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(l)(B) (2012). The statute also defines "forward-looking statement" to
include "any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any statement" of management's
plans and objectives. Id. § 78u-5(i)(l)(D). The court said that K-V's words "may also fairly be categorized as the underlying assumptions that are recognized as part of the protected forward-looking
statements." K-V, 791 F.3d at 921.
243. K-V, 791 F.3d at 921.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 922.
247. Id.at917-18.
248. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
249. K-V, 791 F.3d at 918 (quoting 10-K). The warnings in the 10-K referred to the drug as
"Gestiva," but K-V later rebranded the drug as "Makena." Id. at 917.
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forcement of exclusivity," tying this risk to the orphan-drug status of the very medicine that underlay the lawsuit. 250
INSIDER TRADING

In 2014, the Second Circuit held, in United States v. Newman, that a tipper violates Rule lOb-5 only if he or she receives a personal benefit from the tip and
that benefit is "of some consequence. "251 The Second Circuit added that, while
an inference of such benefit might be based on a personal relationship between
the tipper and a tippee, "such an inference is impermissible in the absence of
proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange
that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature. "252 The court added that this "standard, although permissive, does not suggest that the Government may prove the receipt
of a personal benefit by the mere fact of a friendship, particularly of a casual or
social nature," and that it would not be enough "that two individuals were
alumni of the same school or attended the same church. "253 The Second Circuit
held, as well, that a remote tippee-in order to violate Rule lOb-5-must know
that the original tipper breached his or her duty in providing the tip which, in
turn, means that the remote tippee must know that the original tipper received a
personal benefit "of some consequence" from conveying the material nonpublic
information. 254
The Ninth Circuit wrestled with Newman last year in United States v. Salman.255 In Salman, the defendant traded on inside information that (i) he received from Michael Kara, who became the defendant's brother-in-law, and
(ii) Michael Kara, in turn, received from Maher Kara, who was Michael's younger
brother, who worked as an investment banker at Citigroup, and who was engaged to, and married, the defendant's sister. 256 On appeal of his conviction
for insider trading as a remote tippee under Rule lOb-5, 257 the defendant contended there was insufficient evidence at trial to show either that the original tipper (Maher) received an adequate personal benefit or that, even if so, the defendant knew of such benefit. 258

250. Id. at 922. Another opinion on forward-looking statements, Pension Fund Group v. TempurPedic International, Inc., 614 F. App'x 237, 244 (6th Cir. 2015), held that cautionary language was
sufficient to invoke the statutory protections, where the warnings referred to products introduced
by competitors but did not include the issuer's internal analysis of the particular competitive threat
posed by one of those products.
251. 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 442-43, 447-54.
255. 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15628)
256. Id. at 1088-89.
257. Id. at 1088, 1090.
258. Id. at 1091.
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Affirming the conviction, 259 the Ninth Circuit disagreed with Newman to the
extent that the Second Circuit's holding could be read to require that the benefit
to the tipper be "tangible." 260 Harkening back to the Supreme Court's words in
Dirhs v. SEC that "a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend"
might provide a sufficient benefit 261 and Newman's statement that a personal
benefit could include "the benefit one would obtain from simply making a gift
of confidential information to a trading relative or friend," 262 the Ninth Circuit
held that the evidence that Maher intended the inside information as a gift to
Michael supplied the necessary benefit to Maher and that, "while [the defendant]
may not have been aware of all the details of the Kara brothers' relationship, the
jury could easily have found that, as a close friend and member (through marriage) of the close-knit Kara clan, [the defendant] must have known that, when
Maher gave confidential information to Michael, he did so with the 'intention to
benefit' a close relative. "263
Significance and analysis. The critical passage from Dirhs reads, in full:
[T]he initial inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider. This
requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings. There are objective facts
and circumstances that often justify such an inference. For example, there may be a
relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from
the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider
makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The tip
and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits
to the recipient. 264
By its reference to "a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such
as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earning," 265
the passage implies an exchange of value for value. This suggests that psychic
satisfaction should not, without more, suffice. Otherwise, virtually any tip
would clear the personal benefit hurdle because there must be some reason, at
least a psychological reason, motivating any tipper to tip. If that is so, the personal benefit element is so easily conjured as to constitute no element at all.
The Ninth Circuit did not need to imply that no "tangible" benefit was needed,
as evidence in the case supported an inference that Maher was, indeed, effectively exchanging the material nonpublic information for value. 266 Perhaps the
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1094.
at 1093.
(quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)).
at 1093-94 (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015)).
263. Id. at 1094.
264. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64 (citation omitted).
265. Id. (emphasis added).
266. Salman, 792 F .3d at 1089 ("Michael helped pay for Maher's college [and,] on one occasion,
[Maher] received a call from Michael asking for a 'favor,' requesting 'information,' and explaining that
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Ninth Circuit will revisit this issue and clarify Salman, by relying on the evidence
of such value and expressly rejecting the notion that emotional satisfaction is
enough to provide any needed benefit to an original tipper.
MATERIALITY

A fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would consider the fact important in deciding whether to buy or sell a security,
because the fact significantly alters the total mix of information that is available
and relevant to that buy/sell decision. 267 Language that expresses general optimism or a favorable characterization of facts, but that would not be important
to a reasonable investor, is immaterial "puffery. "268 The D. C. Circuit applied
that principle in 2015. 269 The Second Circuit did as well, while also considering
both whether an asserted financial error was material even though it constituted
a small percentage of the relevant company-wide number and whether there was
a material difference between a bank saying that a regulator had "encouraged"
the bank to raise capital instead of saying that the regulator had "required" the
bank to do sono The First Circuit related materiality to scienter, finding insufficient evidence of scienter where the materiality of the misrepresentation was
marginal. 271 Both that court and the Second Circuit rendered decisions that permitted defense challenges to materiality in the face of testimony by financial industry participants that misrepresentations were important to them. 272
Puffery. In re Harman International Industries, Inc. Securities Litigation held, in
reversing a district court dismissal of a Rule lOb-5 complaint, that the defendants' statement in an annual report-that "[s]ales of aftermarket products, particularly PNDs, were very strong during fiscal 2007"-was not puffery but
instead an actionable statement. 273 Centrally, the plaintiffs alleged the defendants concealed during the class period that Harman had a large and growing
inventory of obsolete PNDs that the company could only sell at steep discounts.274 In discussing the materiality of the "very strong [sales]" statement,
the court noted plaintiffs' allegations that (i) PNDs were sold by the company's
automotive division, which brought in 70% of Harman's business and the bulk

he 'owe[d] somebody.' After Michael turned down Maher's offer of money, Maher gave him a tip
about an upcoming acquisition instead." (quoting trial testimony)).
267. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988).
268. See In re Apple Comput., Inc., 127 F. App'x 296, 304 (9th Cir. 2005) ("We have held the
following ... statements to be non-actionable puffery: 'We're doing well and I think we have a
great future'; ... 'Everything is clicking .... New products are coming in a wave, not a trickle.
Old products are doing very well'; and 'I am optimistic about [the company's] performance during
this decade."' (citation omitted)).
269. See infra notes 273-76 and accompanying text.
270. See infra notes 277-95 and accompanying text.
271. See infra notes 296-311 and accompanying text.
272. See infra notes 296-331 and accompanying text.
273. 791 F.3d 90, 94, 108-11, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting FY 2007 Annual Report), cert. denied, 84 U.S.LW. 3307 (US Feb. 29, 2016) (No 15-694)
274. See supra notes 204-29 and accompanying text (discussing the case).

Caselaw Developments 2015

1037

of its revenue, and (ii) PNDs "had been the focus of recent public statements. "275
The D.C. Circuit found that the "very strong" sales comment was not puffery because the "statement was tied to a product and a time period and it was not too
vague to be material. "276
In IBEW Local Union No. 58 Pension Trust Fund & Annuity Fund v. Royal Banh of
Scotland Group, PLC, the Second Circuit also addressed puffery, and in addition
wrestled with more difficult issues of quantitative and qualitative materiality and
statements about the relationship between a bank and its regulator during the
credit crisis. 277 Purchasers of American Depository Shares ("ADS") of The
Royal Bank of Scotland Group, PLC ("RBS") alleged that RBS and several executives violated Rule lOb-5 during the period between October 17, 2007, and
January 20, 2009, by making allegedly fraudulent statements about (i) RBS's acquisition of a Dutch bank named ABN AMRO; (ii) RBS's exposure to the subprime mortgage market; and (iii) a Rights lssue.27 8 Ultimately, RBS proved to
be an investor disaster, as the British government rescued the bank through a
$40 billion bailout in exchange for a ninety-four percent ownership interest,
and the price of the ADS declined significantly during the class period.27 9
Second Circuit authority holds that "[s] tatements of corporate optimism may
be actionable securities violations if 'they are worded as guarantees or are supported by specific statements of fact, or if the speaker does not genuinely or reasonably believe them."' 280 The court found the following statements about the
acquisition to be "inactionable puffery" 281 -that integration of ABN AMRO
into RBS was "off to a promising start," that the deal "has rarely seemed more
attractive and relevant than it does at this point," that "the positive view we
have of the ABN [AMRO] businesses has been confirmed," that the " [u] nderlying
performance of retained ABN AMRO businesses [is] in line with expectations,"
that "[t]here are a lot of areas where [the ABN AMRO acquisition] just goes
ching, ching, ching, ching, ching," that "[w]e are happy we bought what we
thought we bought," and that ABN AMRO businesses were "kind of in line with
where we thought they would be and probably [are] slightly ahead of the equivalent number last year. "282 Those statements were "not worded as guarantees and
there [were] no allegations that defendants did not reasonably believe them. "283

275. Harman, 791 F.3d at 109.
276. Id. Compare Pension Fund Grp. v. Tempur-Pedic Int'!, Inc., 614 F. App'x 237, 245 (6th Cir.
2015) (concluding that statement that issuer had "strengthened [its] competitiveness" was "immaterial as a matter of law"); id. at 24 7 (concluding that reference to the issuer's "consumer preferred"
product line was puffery).
277. 783 F.3d 383 (2d Cir. 2015)
278. Id. at 387.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 392 (quoting In re Int'! Bus. Machs. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted)).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 388 (quoting, in the first and second instances, an RBS press release dated December 6,
2007; and quoting, in the remaining instances, an RBS conference call on February 28, 2008).
283. Id. at 392.
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Quantitative materiality. As to subprime assets, the plaintiffs alleged that an
RBS press release on December 6, 2007, which represented "[t]otal U.S. subprime exposure[ ]" to be $10.3 billion, understated the true exposure by $6.8
billion. 284 The Second Circuit addresses quantitative materiality in a two-step
process that it draws from SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99. 285 In the
first step, the court determines whether the misstatement is less than five percent
of the relevant company-wide number. 286 If the misstatement falls below that
threshold, the court preliminarily considers the misstatement immaterial but
proceeds to a second step, which addresses whether the error is nevertheless material for any of a number of qualitative reasons. 287 In RBS, the alleged $6.8 billion understatement "constitute [d] less than 4% of RBS's total asset backed securities exposure, and less than 1% of its total assets," and no qualitative
consideration applied to make the asserted misstatement material. 288
Regulator encouragement versus regulator mandate. While the rulings on the acquisition and subprime exposure statements were unanimous-in this opinion
by which the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal 289-the ruling on representations related to the rights offering split the panel two-to-one. 290 RBS stated on
April 22, 2008, that the determination to raise capital through the rights offering
was "purely the Board of RBS['s] decision" and that, while the Financial Services
Authority ("FSA," RBS's regulator) was "happy to see [RBS] raising capital and
encourage[d RBS] in [its] plans to do so," RBS was "not asked to raise capital
by anyone," not even the FSA. 291 The timeline showed that "RBS had already
started preparations for the Rights Issue by April 4, 2008-five days before
RBS's conversation with the FSA's CEO, when the FSA purportedly 'specifically
required' RBS to conduct a Rights Issue." 292 Noting that "RBS was not deemed by
the FSA to have violated FSA's minimum capital guidelines," the majority held
that the "critical facts were already known to the investing market: RBS needed
an infusion of capital; it was taking additional write-downs; the FSA was closely
monitoring RBS's situation and encouraging a Rights Issue; and there was generally a steep deterioration in market conditions and credit market outlooks. "293
In light of this context, the majority held that "a reasonable investor would have

284. Id. at 391 (quoting press release).
285. Id. at 390-91 (citing SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150, 45151-52
(Aug. 19, 1999))
286. Id. at 390.
287. Id. at 390-91.
288. Id. at 391 ("Plaintiffs do not allege that the amount of exposure could have been calculated
precisely, masks a change in earnings, changes a loss into income or vice versa, or involves an unlawful transaction, or that the misstatements resulted in a significant positive market reaction.
And, although RBS's asset-backed securitization group was a driving factor in its profitability, this
factor alone does not tip the scales in favor of finding the misstatements material.").
289. Id. at 387, 394.
290. Id. at 394 (Leval,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
291. Id. at 388, 392-93 (majority opinion) (quoting public statements by RBS that accompanied
announcement of Rights Issue).
292. Id. (quoting testimony of FSA CEO to Parliament in 2012).
293. Id.
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deemed the difference between [whether the FSA] 'encouraged' [RBS to raise
capital or] 'required' [RBS to raise capital] to be immaterial. "294 The dissenting
panel member disagreed on this point, because "[t]he fact that . . a regulatory
agency has required a bank to raise capital implies that the regulatory agency
finds the bank's capital reserves to be dangerously low. "295
Significance and analysis. It is difficult to reconcile Harman and RBS in a manner
that provides guidance to issuers and their officers. Similarly, it is difficult to understand the RBS majority position that, on a motion to dismiss, the difference between a bank being "encouraged" by a regulator to raise additional capital and "required" to do so would be immaterial. Those cases illustrate that, before a client
makes a statement, the counselor may find it hard to advise a client that the content
constitutes "inactionable puffery." On the other hand, after the client speaks and is
sued, an aggressive approach to arguing that content is immaterial may be in order.
Proof of materiality and the relationship between materiality and scienter. In 2015,
two public enforcement cases highlighted that federal securities law defines materiality objectively, with one of those cases also holding that the materiality of a
misrepresentation is relevant to whether a defendant made it with scienter.
In Flannery v. SEC, the First Circuit vacated an SEC order sanctioning a former
vice president and head of North American Product Engineering ("Product
Engineer") at State Street Bank and Trust Company ("State Street"). 296 The
Commission had found that the Product Engineer violated Rule lOb-5 and section
l 7(a) 297 of the Securities Act, when on May 10, 2007, he presented PowerPoint
slides to a group of investors that included a client of an institutional consulting
firm, whose representative (Mr. Hammerstein) also attended the presentation. 298
The Product Engineer used a standard slide to describe a group of State-Street managed funds collectively known as the Limited Duration Bond Fund ("LDBF"). 299
Called the "Typical Portfolio Slide," the slide represented, among other things,
that the LDBF's holdings were distributed, by "sector" market value, so:
ABS [Asset-Backed Securities]:

55%;

CMBS [Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities]: 25%;
MBS [Mortgage-Backed Securities]:

10%;

Agency:

5%;

Corporates:

0%;

Cash:

5%.300

294. Id. at 394.
295. Id. (Leval,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
296. 810 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2015).
297. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012). Like a violation of Rule lOb-5, see infra note 357 and accompanying text, a violation of section 17(a)(l) requires proof of scienter, Flannery, 810 F.3d at 9.
298. Flannery, 810 F.3d at 5-6.
299. Id. at 3, 6.
300. Id. at 5 (percentages shown in bar graph on slide).
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An internal State Street "fact sheet," however, showed that, as of March 31, 2007,
the LDBF held 100 percent of its assets in ABS. 301
Mr. Hammerstein testified before an SEC ALJ that he was surprised when
he later learned that the LDBF was fully invested in ABS, and his consulting
firm advised its clients to sell their positions in the LDBF because it "felt that
State Street did not adequately inform [the audience] of the risks in the portfolio."302 Specifically, Mr. Hammerstein's firm sent a letter to its clients "recommending that they liquidate their holdings and citing the May 10 meeting
where '[t]he LD Bond Fund Portfolio Manager
did not disclose the actual
sector exposure at the time, instead presenting "typical" portfolio characteristics."'303 The First Circuit nevertheless concluded that the Commission's "finding
of materiality was marginal. "304 The slide stated that the information it presented
was "Typical" rather than up to date, and the fact sheet showing one hundred
percent investment in ABS was available six weeks before the May 10 meeting. 305
The information was also available on State Street's website, 306 and an expert for
the Product Engineer testified that "a typical investor in an unregistered fund
would understand that it could specifically request additional information regarding the fund. "307 The Product Engineer himself also testified that (i) "in
his experience, investors did not focus on sector breakdown when making
their investment decisions and that LDBF investors did not focus on how
much of the LDBF investment was in ABS versus MBS"; (ii) he "did not recall
ever discussing the Typical Portfolio Slide or being asked a question about the
actual sector breakdown when presenting the slide"; and (iii) "[h]e did not update the Typical Portfolio Slide's sector breakdowns because he did not think the
typical sector breakdowns were important to investors. "308 Nothing in the record
showed "that the credit risks posed by ABS, CMBS, or MBS were materially different from each other. "309
Observing that " [q] uestions of materiality and scienter are connected"-in the
sense that "[i] f it is questionable whether a fact is material or its materiality is
marginal, that tends to undercut the argument that defendants acted with the
requisite intent or extreme recklessness in not disclosing the fact" 310-the
301. Id.atll.
302. Id. at 10 (quoting Hammerstein's testimony before ALJ).
303. Id. (quoting letter).
304. Id. at 9-10.
305. Id. at 10-11.
306. Id. at 11 n.8. But the court added that it did "not suggest that the mere availability of accurate
information negates an inaccurate statement. Rather, when a slide is labeled 'typical,' and where a
reasonable investor would not rely on one slide but instead would conduct due diligence when making an investment decision, the availability of actual and accurate information is relevant." Id.
307. Id. at 11 (quoting expert).
308. Id. at 11-12.
309. Id. at 10; id. at 10 n.6 ('The Typical Portfolio Slide represented that 85% of the LDBF's investment was in AAA- and AA-rated bonds (45% and 40% respectively), while the March 31, 2007,
fact sheet disclosed that 94.46% of its investment was in AAA- and AA-rated bonds (62.2% and
32.26% respectively).").
310. Id. at 9 (quoting City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Waters Corp.,
632 F.3d 751, 757 (1st Cir. 2011)) (alteration added).

Caselaw Developments 2015

1041

First Circuit held that the "thin materiality showing" with respect to the Typical
Portfolio Slide "cannot support a finding of scienter. "311
Materiality of misrepresentations in professional-to-professional communications in
the securities industry. The Second Circuit also published a 2015 opinion that addressed materiality in the context of transactions between professionals in the financial industry. The defendant in United States v. Litvak, worked as a trader at
Jefferies&:: Co. ('Jefferies"), a broker-dealer. 312 The defendant sometimes bought
and sometimes sold debt securities for Jefferies' customers, and sometimes did so
for Jefferies itself. 313 The government charged that the defendant made three
types of misrepresentations to counterparties. 314
First, in some instances, the defendant misrepresented the acquisition costs of
residential MBS ("RMBS"), as exemplified by a transaction involving the AllianceBernstein Legacy Securities Fund ("ABF"), when he stated that Jefferies had
paid $58 (based on a $100 face value) when in fact Jefferies bought the RMBS
for $57.50-a difference of 50 cents. 315 The ABF representative who dealt
with the defendant in the transaction testified that the difference "would have
'mattered' and been 'important' to him" 316 "[b]ecause we use that information
of him buying at 58 to set the price that we would buy it at. If we could have
bought it cheaper, that would have been better for my investors. "317 ABF paid
$58.00 per $100 face value for a total of about $12 million for the RMBS, but
would have paid approximately $60,000 less if the price had been lower by
50 cents per $100. 318
Second, the government charged that the defendant misrepresented-to sellers of securities-the price at which Jefferies had arranged to resell the securities,
as exemplified by a transaction in which the defendant represented to York Capital Management ("York"), a hedge fund selling RMBS to Jefferies, that Jefferies
had agreed to resell the RMBS for $61.25 (based on a $100 face value) when,
in fact, Jefferies had agreed to resell the RMBS for $62.375. 319 The York representative with whom the defendant negotiated agreed to sell the securities to Jefferies for $61.00 per $100 face value so that Jefferies could make a $.25 profit on
the resale, but testified that the "difference [in Jefferies' resale price] would have
been 'important' to her" 320 "'[b]ecause that mean[t] that [she] didn't get the best
execution and that [the defendant] sold them for a lot higher than what he had

311. Id. at 11; see infra notes 490-91 and accompanying text (discussing similar analysis by First
Circuit). In a portion of the decision not summarized in the text, the First Circuit also vacated the
Commission's decision sanctioning a former chief investment officer at State Street. Flannery, 810
F.3d at 3-4, 12-15.
312. 808 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2015)
313. Id. at 167.
314. Id. at 167-68.
315. Id. at 167.
316. Id. (quoting testimony of ABF representative).
317. Id. at 167 n.5 (quoting testimony of ABF representative).
318. Id. at 167.
319. Id. at 167-68.
320. Id. at 168 (quoting testimony of York representative).
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told [her]."' 321 If York had received $62.125 (to facilitate Jefferies making a
$0.25 profit on resale at the price at which Jefferies had actually agreed to resell),
York would have garnered about $228,500 more in this transaction totalling approximately $20 million. 322
Third, the government alleged that the defendant represented-to second
parties-that Jefferies was negotiating with third parties instead of dealing in
its own inventory, as exemplified in a transaction with a hedge fund called Magnetar Capital ("MC'), in which the defendant said that Jefferies was buying RMBS
from a third party at $53.00 (on a $100 face value) in order to resell them to MC,
when in fact Jefferies already owned the RMBS that the defendant was selling to
MC and had bought them for $51.25. 323 MC paid Jefferies $53.25 so that Jefferies could make a $0.25 per $100 face value "commission." 324 The representative of MC testified that, had he known the truth, the difference in the price
Jefferies had paid would have "reflected 'a very different situation,"' and that,
if he had known that Jefferies was selling from its own inventory, MC would
not have paid any "commission" at all. 325 If MC had not paid the "commission,"
then MC would have paid approximately $14,000 less (on a total cost of about
$5.5 million) to acquire the RMBS. 326
On this record, the Second Circuit held that "a rational jury could have found
that [the defendant's] misrepresentations were material" and therefore the trial
court had properly sent that issue to the jury. 327 But, in reversing the conviction,328 the appellate court also held that the trial court exceeded its discretion
in excluding the defendant's proffered expert testimony that the RMBS market
was not efficient and that professionals set the prices on which they bought
and sold by using computer models to determine the securities' value rather
than by statements made by counterparties. 329

Significance and analysis. Both Flannery and Litvak suggest that information might
not be material even though financial sector participants in the transactions-in
Flannery, the consulting firm providing advice to institutional investors and, in Litvak, representatives of a mutual fund and two hedge funds-thought that the information was important. The law permits such a conclusion because the law

321. Id. at 168 n.6 (quoting testimony of York representative).
322. Id. at 168.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 168 & n.7 (quoting testimony of MC representative).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 175.
328. Id. at 174-75, 178-85, 190.
329. Id. at 180-84. The Second Circuit also held that the trial judge wrongly excluded expert testimony that the defendant dealt at arms-length with counterparties. Id. at 186-88. Proposed testimony
regarding the "nature of [the defendant's] relationship with the alleged victims formed the context in
which the jury had to consider whether the portfolio managers and traders who testified reflected the
views of a reasonable investor ... [and] would have supported [the defendant's] materiality defense."
Id. at 187-88. The proffered expert opinion would also have rebutted testimony by one counterparty
representative, who stated his understanding that the defendant was acting as the counterparty's
agent. Id. at 186-88.
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judges materiality objectively rather than subjectively-from the viewpoint of the
"reasonable investor" rather than simply that of the alleged victim. 330 Nevertheless,
it should be an infrequent case in which this principle is invoked to raise the serious possibility that professional participants in the securities markets might not
fit within what must surely be the broad confines of the term "reasonable
investor. "331
DUTY TO DISCLOSE

Item 303(a)(3)(ii) of Regulation S-K requires that a public company "[d]escribe
any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably
expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations." 332 In 2014, the Ninth Circuit held,
in the NVIDIA Securities Litigation, that "Item 303 does not create a duty to disclose
for purposes of Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5." 333 In 2015, the Second Circuit
disagreed.
The plaintiffs, in Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, focused on Morgan Stanley's (i) purchase of credit default swaps ("CDSs"), by which Morgan Stanley
made annual payments in exchange for the sellers' promises to pay Morgan Stanley if mezzanine tranches of RMBS supporting certain collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs") defaulted or declined in value (referred to in the opinion as the
"Short Position"), and (ii) sale of CDSs, by which the purchasers paid Morgan
Stanley annual payments in exchange for Morgan Stanley's promise to pay the
purchasers if super-senior tranches defaulted or declined in value (referred to
in the opinion as the "Long Position"). 334 In effect, Morgan Stanley "was betting
that defaults in the subprime mortgage markets would be significant enough to
impair the value of the higher-risk CDO tranches referenced by the Short Position, but not significant enough to impair the value of the lower-risk CDO
tranches referenced by the Long Position. "335 When it turned out that the financial crisis was far more serious than Morgan Stanley anticipated, the firm lost billions of dollars on the combined Short and Long Positions. 336
The plaintiffs brought a Rule lOb-5 action-on behalf of all those who bought
Morgan Stanley stock between June 20, 2007, and November 19, 2007-against
Morgan Stanley and six present and former officers, basing the claim, among
other things, on the allegation that, "[b]y July 4[, 2007,] at the latest, [d]efendants knew that the Long Position was reasonably expected to have an unfavor-

330. Id. at 175, 184.
331. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) ("The speculators
and chartists of Wall and Bay Streets are also 'reasonable' investors entitled to the same legal protection afforded conservative traders.").
332. 17 CFR. § 229 303(a)(3)(ii) (2015)
333. In re NVIDIA Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2349
(2015)
334. 776 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2015)
335. Id.
336. Id.
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able material effect on revenue" and that the defendants violated the requirement
of Regulation S-K Item 303(a)(3)(ii) by failing to disclose that fact in Morgan
Stanley's Forms 10-Q for the second and third quarters of 2007. 337 Specifically
disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit's NVIDIA decision, 338 the Second Circuit
broke the analysis down into two parts: (i) duty to disclose and (ii) materiality. 339 Thus, in a Rule lOb-5 action based on an omission, a plaintiff must
plead that the defendants had a duty to disclose the omitted fact. 340 Such a
duty "may arise when there is [(a)] 'a corporate insider trad[ing] on confidential
information,' [(b)] a 'statute or regulation requiring disclosure,' or [(c)] a corporate statement that would otherwise be 'inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading."'341 Regulation S-K Item 303(a)(3)(ii) sufficed-per category (b)-to impose
a duty to disclose sufficient for Rule lOb-5. 342 Although a plaintiff must also
plead and prove in a Rule lOb-5 omission case that the undisclosed fact was material,343 a plaintiff that shows both that the defendant violated the duty to disclose under Item 303(a)(3)(ii) and that the undisclosed fact was material, can
win a judgment, provided, of course, that the plaintiff can plead and prove all
other elements of a Rule lOb-5 claim, including scienter. 344
In the Morgan Stanley case, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs "adequately alleged that Defendants breached their Item 303 duty to disclose that
Morgan Stanley faced a deteriorating subprime mortgage market that, in light
of the company's exposure to the market, was likely to cause trading losses
that would materially affect the company's financial condition." 345 Plaintiffs alleged that a Morgan Stanley economist wrote on February 27, 2007, that "the
long-awaited meltdown in subprime mortgage lending is now underway," and
Morgan Stanley analysts reported in the summer of that year that "[r]atings
downgrades in [asset backed] CDO tranches are inevitable and material. "346 Morgan Stanley allegedly had written down the Long Position by $300 million by the
time the class period opened and formed a task force to develop strategies to sell
down assets at risk as a result of the subprime collapse. 347 This was enough to

337. Id. at 96, 98 (quoting joint appendix) (first and second alterations by appellate court).
338. Id. at 103-04.
339. Id. at 100-03.
340. Id. at 100-01.
341. Id. at 101 (quoting Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting, in
the first instance, Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1987); then quoting, in the
second and third instances, Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1990) (en bane))).
342. Id. at 101-02; id. at 102 ("Item 303 imposes the type of duty to speak that can, in appropriate
cases, give rise to liability under Section lO(b).").
34 3. Id. at 102-03. For an explanation of how Item 303(a)(3)(ii) can require disclosure of facts
that are not material, see 2014 Case/aw Developments, supra note 68, at 950-51.
344. Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103-04 (reprising the court's "decision that failure to comply
with Item 303 in a Form 10-Q can give rise to liability under Rule 1Ob-5 so long as the omission
is material ... and the other elements of Rule lOb-5 have been established"); id. at 100 (listing
the elements of a private cause of action in a Rule lOb-5 case, including scienter).
345. Id. at 104.
346. Id. (quoting joint appendix).
347. Id. at 104-05.
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plead that the company "was faced with a 'known trend[ ]
. that [was] reasonably expected to have material effects' on the company's financial position. "348
The Second Circuit, however, added a significant caveat. While rejecting-as
"generic"-the defense claim that Morgan Stanley satisfied its disclosure obligations under Item 303(a)(3)(ii) "by disclosing the deterioration of the real estate,
credit, and subprime mortgage markets, and its potential negatively to affect
Morgan Stanley," the court held that the firm did not need to "announce its internal business strategies or to identify the particulars of its trading positions
such as the Long Position. "349 It "needed to disclose only that it faced deteriorating real estate, credit, and subprime mortgage markets, that it had significant exposure to those markets, and that if the trends came to fruition, the company
faced trading losses that could materially affect its financial condition." 350
That caveat not affecting the holding, the complaint adequately alleged an
Item 303(a)(3)(ii) violation, and the court then proceeded to the second requirement for an omissions claim under Rule lOb-5, resolving that requirement by
"assum[ing], arguendo, that [the Morgan Stanley] omission was material." 351
The Second Circuit nevertheless affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the case 352-insofar as it pertained to the failure to make the Regulation S-K
Item 303(a)(3)(ii) disclosure 353-due to the plaintiffs' failure to plead facts raising a strong inference of scienter. 354 The court read Morgan Stanley's formation
of the task force as showing "that Morgan Stanley was in the process of assessing
the risk to its proprietary trade during the second and third quarters of 2007,"
and that the complaint failed to allege "when employees realized that the more
pessimistic assessments of the market were likely to come to fruition and that
they would be unable to reduce the Long Position." 355 Taking into account
that Morgan Stanley was, in the second and third quarters, still making
money on the Short Position and that the firm "did fully report its exposure to
mortgage securities backed by subprime loans in November 2007-less than a
month after its third quarter filing and a month in advance of the next quarterly
report"-the plaintiffs were simply, in the court's view, complaining that Morgan
Stanley should have made a disclosure somewhat earlier than it did, which may

348. Id. at 105 (quoting Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg. 22427, 22429 (May 24, 1989)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241 & 271)).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 105-06. It is hard to see the difference between the language that Morgan Stanley did
use, see supra note 349 and accompanying text, and the language the court said Morgan Stanley should
have used, see supra text accompanying this note. Perhaps the key was that Morgan Stanley should
have linked the subprime mortgage deterioration to the firm's trading activities.
351. Id. at 104, 106.
352. Id. at 108.
353. The published opinion deals only with the portion of the plaintiffs' case alleging that Morgan
Stanley's Item 303 violation concealed the extent of its exposure to the subprime mortgage market. Id.
at 98, 100. In an accompanying summary order, the court affirmed dismissal of the rest of the case.
Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 598 F. App'x 25 (2d Cir. 2015).
354. Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 106-07.
355. Id. at 107.
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have suggested negligence, but did not suggest the kind of "consciously reckless"
conduct prohibited by Rule lOb-5. 356
SCIENTER AND PLEADING SCIENTER

To be successful on a Rule lOb-5 claim, the plaintiff must plead and prove
that the defendant acted with scienter-defined by the Supreme Court as "a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud," 357 and expanded by all courts of appeals to include some form of recklessness with respect to misleading investors. 358 The Exchange Act requires that a Rule lOb-5
complaint "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with [that] required state of mind." 359 To satisfy the statutory pleading standard, the facts alleged in the complaint, together with judicially noticeable material, must raise an inference of scienter that is "cogent
and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent. "360
Four noteworthy court of appeals opinions in 2015 considered scienter in
cases where plaintiffs alleged faulty accounting. The Eleventh Circuit found
that plaintiffs failed to adequately allege the scienter of a CFO and auditor as
to cash balances where the issuer reported $100 million in cash on hand but defaulted on a $3 .5 million debt payment. 361 The Second Circuit held scienter allegations inadequate against an auditor where the issuer's U.S. financial statements reported far more favorable numbers than the statements that the issuer
submitted to a regulator in China. 362 The Tenth Circuit found scienter allegations insufficient in a case where an issuer delayed reporting a billing dispute
with a major customer, with the decision resting on the defendants' nonculpable explanation that it took time for the dispute to filter up the management
chain and that, after top management appreciated that there was an issue, management investigated to get to the bottom of the problem and resolved the billing
with the customer, before disclosing it. 363 The Fifth Circuit ruled that plaintiffs
failed to allege scienter in a case built around mis-valuation of MBS where the
valuations involved subjective judgments. 364
In another case also involving alleged financial fraud, the Tenth Circuit held
that a complaint satisfied the high scienter pleading standard applicable to private Rule lOb-5 claims where a CEO misstated the reason that a strategic partner
declined to purchase an interest in assets that the CEO's company owned, with
the court rejecting the argument that, if the CEO mischaracterized why the deal
failed, he did so only to help his company (and its shareholders) obtain a high
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

Id.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
8 LOUIS Loss ET AL., SECUR!TlES REGULATION 150 n.544 (4th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2016).
15 USC § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012)
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makar Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).
See infra notes 370-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 383-406 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 407-24 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 425-55 and accompanying text.
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price from other potential buyers and therefore committed no securities
fraud. 365
Two decisions ruled on scienter allegations in cases originating in the drug
and medical device industry. The First Circuit found scienter pleading inadequate in an action against a medical device company that made various public
palliative comments during a long-running dialogue with the FDA over offlabel marketing. 366 The Fourth Circuit, however, held that plaintiffs properly alleged scienter where a drug company specifically described communications
with the FDA, but omitted negative facts from those descriptions. 367
Finally, in two cases, courts of appeals considered more general scienter issues. The Ninth Circuit addressed imputation of an officer's scienter to a corporate defendant. The court of appeals held that the "adverse interest" exception to
such an imputation has, itself, an exception and does not apply where the officer
communicates to investors with apparent authority from the company. 368 The
Second Circuit ruled that scienter does not require an intent to harm. 369
CFO and auditor liability premised on size of accounting inconsistency. Investors in
Brophy v. ]iangbo Pharmaceuticals, Inc. brought a Rule lOb-5 action against Jiangbo's former CFO and its former outside auditor. 370 Plaintiffs based their case
against the CFO on the ground that she had signed certifications to the Jiangbo
periodic filings that (i) stated the company had adequate internal controls and
that the financial statements were accurate, even though the filings overstated
the company's cash balances, and (ii) failed to disclose a related-party transaction
in which Jiangbo transferred $31 million to a company controlled by the Jiangbo
chairman. 371 Plaintiffs based their case against the outside auditor on the auditor's unqualified opinion on annual financial statements for fiscal 2010-statements suffering from the same two defects, overstating Jiangbo's cash balances
and failing to disclose the related-party transaction. 372 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the case as to both defendants because the investors failed to
adequately plead scienter. 373
As to the CFO and the cash balances, the investors relied largely on the theory
that the misstatement was so large that the CFO must have been aware of it. 374
But, although the plaintiffs pointed to the inconsistency between the approximately
$100 million in cash reported in the company's filings during the June 8, 2010,
through May 31, 2011, class period and Jiangbo's default in early 2011 on a

365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

See
See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra
infra

notes 456-68 and accompanying text.
notes 469-500 and accompanying text.
notes 501-29 and accompanying text.
notes 530-39 and accompanying text.
notes 540-43 and accompanying text.
781 F.3d 1296, 1298-1300 (11th Cir. 2015)
Id. at 1300-01.
Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1298-99, 1307-08.
Id. at 1302-03.
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$3.5 million debt payment, 375 the plaintiffs "fail[ed] to allege any particular amount
or even a range" of the actual cash on hand and without such "specifics, [they could
not] persuasively allude to the magnitude of the fraud as a basis for a strong inference that [the individual defendant] must have known of the errors as CF0." 376 As
to the related-party transaction, plaintiffs alleged that the CFO's resignation during
an audit committee investigation, and her obstruction of the investigation into that
transaction, demonstrated scienter. 377 However, balanced against the intuition that
resigning during a fraud investigation appeared incriminating was "the fact that [the
CFO] continued[, after the resignation,] to work for the company on a part-time
basis" which "equally supports a nonculpable explanation" for the departure. 378
Moreover, while the CFO did not provide the audit committee with the information
it requested, "she personally prepared the materials for review and preliminarily
agreed to turn them over pending the company's approval." 379 This weighed so
much in her favor that, even though "she neglected a prevailing duty to provide
her materials to the committee regardless of the chairman's wishes," these events
did not "add much weight to an inference of scienter. "380
The appellate court found the pleadings against the auditor deficient as well.
The auditor was named solely because of one clean opinion on one year's financial statements, and the complaint did "not set out in what ways [the] audit [producing that opinion] was deficient. "381 While the auditor declined to stand for
reappointment and did so "around the same time as [the CFO] resigned and
[an] SEC investigation began," there was "no connection between the fact of
an SEC investigation and [the auditor's] state of mind that a reviewing court
may reasonably draw on the face of the complaint. "382
Auditor liability premised on issuer submitting financial statements to U.S. regulators that differed from those that the issuer submitted to foreign regulators. Following
dismissal of the auditor defendants from claims in the first amended complaint,
375. Id. at 1300. The district court decision includes the class period. In re jiangbo Pharm., Inc.
Sec. Litig., 884 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1248 (S.D. Fla. 2012). The plaintiffs implied that, ifthe company
had really possessed the large amount of cash it reported, it would not have defaulted on the relatively small debt principal payment. Brophy, 781 F.3d at 1300.
376. Brophy, 781 F.3d at 1304.
377. Id. at 1305. The CFO resigned effective on March 31, 2011. ]iangbo Sec. Litig., 884 F. Supp.
2d at 1260. Two members of the company's audit committee resigned on June 6, 2011, and their
resignation letter-which complained about unsatisfied investigative requests concerning the $31
million related-party transaction-allegedly disclosed that transaction for the first time. Brophy,
781 F.3d at 1300-01.
378. Brophy, 781 F.3d at 1305.
379. Id.
380. Id. As to a general duty to disclose the related-party transaction to investors, the complaint
failed to allege when the CFO became aware of that transaction and, therefore, failed properly to allege that its absence constituted a material omission in the company's SEC filings for which the CFO
was responsible. Id. at 1306. The court also invoked facts that generally argued against the CFO having acted with scienter, including that she was located in Florida while jiangbo conducted its operations in China, and that she did not sell any company stock during the period of the alleged fraud.
Id.
381. Id. at 1307.
382. Id. The court added that, "[a]s an external auditor, [the auditor defendant] was a step more
removed than [the CFO] from any alleged indicators of fraud." Id.
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the In re Advanced Battery Technologies, Inc. plaintiff moved to file a second
amended complaint, alleging that the auditors "falsely represent [ed] that they
performed their audits of Advanced Battery Technologies, Inc. ('ABAT) in accordance with professional standards and that ABAT's filings accurately reflected its
financial condition from . . 2007 through ... 2010." 383 Following the district
court's denial of that motion on the basis that filing the new complaint would be
futile, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment dismissing the auditors on the
basis that the proposed new complaint did not plead facts raising a strong inference of the auditors' scienter. 384
ABAT manufactured rechargeable polymer lithium-ion batteries. 385 The company operated principally in China, but listed its stock on a U.S. exchange after
a reverse merger in 2004. 386 ABAT engaged one of the two auditor defendants
from 2006 through December 14, 2010 (with this defendant auditing the years
2007 through 2009). 387 ABAT engaged the second from December 14, 2010, to
the end of the class period (with this defendant auditing the year 2010). 388
As to the first auditor, the plaintiff pled that it had access to ABAT's filings
with the Chinese Administration of Industry and Commerce ("AIC"), which filings reported dramatically poorer results than the results that ABAT included in
its SEC filings. 389 The plaintiff referred to an expert's opinion "that 'no reasonable auditor would have failed to obtain ABAT's AIC filings."' 390 The plaintiff,
however, "conceded .
[that] none of the accounting standards on which he
relies-the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, Statements on Auditing
Standards, or GAAP-specifically requires an auditor to inquire about or review
a company's foreign regulatory filings. "391 The "conclusory statement" by the expert did not change the court's view that those accounting standards did not
"impos[e] a general duty to inquire[,] the breach of which would constitute recklessness. "392 The plaintiff also contended that a duty to review the AIC filings
befell the auditor because the ABAT financial statements prepared for SEC filings
showed "unusually high profit margins." 393 The Second Circuit, however, held

383. 781 F.3d 638, 641 (2d Cir. 2015)
384. Id. at 641, 644-46.
385. Id. at 642.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 643.
388. Id. The class period ran from May 15, 2007 to March 29, 2011. First Amended Consolidated
Class Action Complaint at para. 1, In re Advanced Battery Techs., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 2279 (CM), 2012
WL 3758085 (SD NY Aug. 29, 2012), 2011 WL 12882766.
389. Advanced Battery, 781 F.3d at 642, 645. The court provided particulars:
[F]rom 2007 to 2009 ABAT reported losses to the AIC while it reported significant profits to the
SEC. The differences were indisputably material. Taking 2007 as an example, ABAT reported to
the AIC that its revenues were approximately $145,000 and that it suffered an operating loss of
$1 million, while it reported to the SEC revenues of $31.9 million and a profit of $10.2 million.

Id. at 642.
390. Id. at 645 (quoting accounting expert).
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
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that "ABATs report of high profit margins in its SEC filings triggered, at most, a
duty to perform a more rigorous audit of those filings," rather than a duty to compare those filings with the AIC filings, and added that any failure by the auditor
to infer wrongdoing from the high margins did not amount to recklessness. 394
As for the plaintiff's argument that ABAT deserved extra scrutiny because its
stock became listed on a U.S. exchange through a reverse merger, the plaintiff
did "not allege that heightened scrutiny of Chinese companies that used reverse
mergers in the United States began prior to mid-2011-in other words, after the
relevant audits in this case. "395 Finally, with respect to the first auditor and
ABATs overall financial results, the plaintiff asserted that the auditor had access
to the underlying data that produced the financial statements filed with the AIC,
that that data contradicted the numbers in the SEC-bound financial statements
the auditor examined, and that the auditor's "failure to spot the discrepancies
was reckless." 396 The Second Circuit, however, found "more compelling" the inference "that ABAT maintained two sets of data-one for its Chinese regulators
and another for its regulators in the United States-and fed [the auditor] false
data to complete its audits. "397
In addition to contending that the first auditor failed to properly investigate
ABATs financial results, the plaintiff contended that (i) ABATs audited financial
statements for 2007 and 2008 falsely identified ZQ Power-Tech Co. Ltd. ("ZQ")
as a wholly owned subsidiary of a wholly owned subsidiary when, in fact, ZQ
was owned by the ABAT chairman/CEO and other investors, who supposedly
had assigned the "benefits and obligations" of their ownership to ABAT; 398
and (ii) the auditor was reckless in failing to discover that ABAT had only a beneficial interest in ZQ rather than a legal interest. 399 The Second Circuit found
that it could, at most, infer negligence from those allegations, 400 not the conscious recklessness required for auditor liability under Rule lOb-5. 401
The allegations against the second auditor focused on a December 2010 transaction in which ABAT purchased Shenzhen Zhongqiang Energy Science&:: Technology Co , Ltd. ("SZ Ltd") for $20 million. 402 The plaintiff alleged that (i) SZ
Ltd. had lost money in each year of its existence; (ii) ABATs chairman/CEO
owned SZ Ltd , having bought it in 2008 for only $1 million; and (iii) the second
auditor "'would have' discovered the fraudulent nature of the ... acquisition had
it performed 'the most basic of audit duties."' 403 However, "conditional allega-

394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(citing, as to the last point, Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 1996)).

at 645-46.
at 642-4 3.
at 646.
at 644.
at 642-4 3.
at 642-43, 646 (quoting proposed second amended complaint).
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tions of the sort 'that [a defendant] "would" have learned the truth' about a company's fraud 'if [it] had performed the "due diligence" it promised' are generally
insufficient to establish the requisite scienter for private securities fraud claims
'under the PSLRA's heightened pleading instructions."' 404 While the plaintiff
also contended that the "inflated purchase price should have alerted [the auditor] that the transaction was a sham," 405 the Second Circuit found no allegation
in the complaint that the auditor knew that the price was too high, and the auditor's "failure to uncover and appreciate the significance of the inflated price .
[did] not represent 'an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary
care."' 406
Significance and analysis. Advanced Battery is very auditor-friendly. Nonetheless, auditors who provide opinions on the financial statements of companies
that are filing financial statements with regulators other than the SEC might usefully consider whether the audit should include an examination of those other
financials.
Delay in obtaining information about billing problem and investigation of problem
before restatement. The In re Gold Resource Corp. Securities Litigation plaintiff alleged Rule lOb-5 financial fraud beginning with the issuer's January 30, 2012,
announcement of 2011 results and continuing to November 8, 2012, when
the issuer disclosed that it (i) was resolving a billing dispute with a customer,
(ii) was restating its financial results for the first and second quarters of 2012,
and (iii) had found a material weakness in internal controls relating to assay sampling by which it billed customers for minerals. 407 The financial fraud allegedly
rendered false or misleading (i) reports of record results for 2011 and the first
quarter of 2012, (ii) a statement in the issuer's 10-K that management had concluded that internal control over financial reporting was effective, and (iii) statements in the 10-Qs for the first and second quarters of 2012 that there were no
changes in internal control over financial reporting. 408
The asserted financial fraud revolved around the contract between Gold Resource Corporation ("GRC") and its customer for product the company mined
in Mexico. 409 The contract permitted GRC to assay samples of the product before shipment and provisionally bill ninety percent of the full price based on
that sampling. 410 The customer then assayed the product on arrival at the customer's warehouse. 411 If the customer's assay result differed materially from

404. Id. at 646 (quoting S. Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 110, 112 (2d Cir.
2009))
405. Id.
406. Id. (quoting Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 98 (2d Cir. 2000)).
407. 776 F.3d 1103, 1106, 1109, 1111 (10th Cir. 2015)
408. Id. at 1109-10.
409. Id. at 1106-07. "GRC had only two buyers to whom it sold all of its [product]-subsidiaries
of the Trafigura Group." Id. at 1107.
410. Id. at 1107.
411. Id.
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GRCs, an umpire conducted an assay and the buyer's final bill was adjusted accordingly.412 These adjustments eventually led to the restatement. 413
The plaintiff characterized this set of events as an "overbilling scheme" that
GRC implemented to inflate its financial results. 414 The plaintiff pled that
GRC and the individual defendants at GRC acted with scienter based on,
among other things, the simplicity of the relevant accounting rules, the company's statement in a November 8, 2012 Form 8-K ("8-K"), that, "[a]s of September 30, 2012, management believe[d] the internal control deficiency ha[d] been
remediated" (which meant, according to the plaintiff, that the defendants were
aware of material billing problems by that date), the company's restatement,
the circumstance that the error affected "core operations," and the small number
of employees at the company. 415 Affirming the district court's dismissal in favor
of the defendants, 416 the Tenth Circuit relied largely on a transcript of statements
that GRCs CEO made during a November 2012 conference call to conclude that
the defendants provided a "plausible, opposing inference" that their conduct was
without fraud. 417
The plausible explanation was that it took GRC some time to discover and sort
out the billing dispute. According to the company's account, employees in
Mexico did not initially credit the buyer's assay results and therefore did not advise management in Denver of the assay discrepancy until the umpire's assay results became available in the third quarter of 2012. 418 When the problem then
came to management's attention, the company instituted an investigation, which
led to the conclusion that the customer had problems at its facility. 419 In settling
their dispute, the customer paid GRCs provisional bills for April, May, and June,
but paid amounts based upon its own assays for shipments in February and
March. 420 In addition, the customer improved security at its receiving facility,
and GRC began sending a representative with shipments to watch over the product until the customer took samples for testing. 421 The Tenth Circuit found that
the defendants' "explanation regarding the delay in their receiving notice of the
variances, particularly given the several months it took until the umpire assays
were finalized," 422 together with the "prudent" decision "to investigate and confirm a claimed discrepancy before disclosing it publicly," 423 provided an ade412. See id. at 1107 & n.3.
413. Id. at 1107, 1111.
414. Id. at 1107.
415. Id. at 1111(quoting8-K); id. at 1113 (quoting GRC's brief).
416. Id.atlll9.
417. Id. at 1116. "Plaintiff referred to the transcript of [the November 2012] conference call in the
amended complaint but then ignored most of its content. The district court took judicial notice of the
entire transcript." Id. at 1114 n.7.
418. Id.at1114.
419. Id. at 1115.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 1116.
423. Id. at 1115; see id. at 1116 ("Defendants had every reason not to disclose the disputed variance before the dispute was investigated and settled.").
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quate competing and nonculpable account, and therefore the court was "not persuaded [that] a reasonable person would deem an inference of scienter more cogent or compelling than an opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent," so that
the plaintiff failed to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. 424
Valuations of MBS. The plaintiffs in Owens v. Jastrow sued former officers of
Guaranty Financial Group, Inc. ("GFG")-which owned Guaranty Bank (together
with GFG, "Guaranty")-and Temple-Inland, Inc. ("Temple"), GFG's former parent, pleading a Rule lOb-5 claim on behalf of investors that purchased GFG stock
between December 12, 2007, and August 24, 2009. 425 The claim centered on allegations that Guaranty held MBS based on risky, adjustable rate mortgages and
that, after Temple spun off GFG, Guaranty overvalued those MBS, underreported
its losses on the MBS, and failed to record those losses as other-than-temporary
impairment ("OTTI"). 426 Ultimately, in July 2009, Guaranty recorded a $1.62 billion impairment on its MBS portfolio at the direction of the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"). 427 GFG filed for bankruptcy on August 27, 2009. 428
The Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court dismissal of the second amended
complaint on the basis that the plaintiffs' allegations failed to raise a strong inference of scienter. 429 Phrasing the issue as whether the complaint pled "sufficient
facts to allege scienter as to each defendant," 430 the court held initially that, while
a district court must analyze the scienter allegations holistically, the district court
"may best make sense of scienter allegations by first looking to the contribution
of each individual allegation to a strong inference of scienter, especially in a complicated case such as this one[, then]
. follow[ing] this initial step with a holistic look at all the scienter allegations. "431 The Fifth Circuit also reiterated its
rejection of "group pleading" scienter allegations, determined that it generally
would "disregard" 432 "allegations that [were] not tied to a particular defendant,"433 but held that it would consider certain allegations that were tied "to
more than one defendant ... because they [were] sufficiently particularized. "434
Turning then to the "[a]llegations common to more than one defendant," the Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiffs pled with particularity that three defendants-Ci) the
CEO/board chair of Temple, who was also the board chair of Guaranty until
424. Id. at 1118. The court of appeals also observed that the "defendants hold eighteen percent of
the stock of GRC[,] ... that there is no allegation they sold any of it during the class period," and that
those facts cut against any scienter inference too. Id. at 1117 n.8.
425. 789 F.3d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 2015) (describing the relationship between Temple, GFG, and
Guaranty); id. at 534 (identifying the class period, and identifying the claim as an alleged violation of
Rule lOb-5); id. at 534, 542, 545-46 (identifying the defendants and their positions). The court states
that its "opinion uses the general term 'Guaranty' when no distinction between GFG and [GB] is warranted." Id. at 533 n.1. This summary uses "Guaranty" where the court uses that word.
426. Id. at 533-34.
427. Id. at 534.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 534, 547.
430. Id. at 535.
431. Id. at 537.
4 32. Id. at 538.
433. Id. at 537.
434. Id. at 538 & n.4.
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August 26, 2008 ("Guaranty's Chairman"), (ii) the Guaranty President/CEO until
November 19, 2008, who was also Guaranty's board chair after August 26, 2008
("Guaranty's CEO"), and (iii) the Guaranty Senior Executive Vice President and
CFO until July 10, 2009 ("Guaranty's CFO"), who was also the Principal Accounting Officer ("PAO") there from October 27, 2008, until July 10, 2009knew that Guaranty was undercapitalized and therefore had a motive to misrepresent Guaranty's financial condition in order to more easily attract additional
investment. 435 While that motive "contribute [d]" to scienter allegations against
those defendants, 436 the lawsuit did not present "the rare case" 437 in which a
strong scienter inference might rest solely on "motive and opportunity" pleading
because Guaranty was not a "single product" company, and the MBS portfolio
constituted no more than twenty-two percent of Guaranty's assets. 438 Although
the plaintiffs alleged that "red flags" alerted defendants that the MBS were
overvalued-Ci) a 250 percent increase, during the nine months preceding
June 30, 2008, in delinquencies on MBS issued by private institutions rather
than government-sponsored entities; (ii) a decrease in the value of such MBS
to sixty percent of cost by June 30, 2008; and (iii) credit rating downgrades
or negative watch warnings in June and July 2008 on ten MBS owned by
Guaranty-the Fifth Circuit responded that these events occurred after most
of the alleged misrepresentations and, in any event, were disclosed by GFG so
that investors could consider them in assessing the value of the MBS that Guaranty owned. 439 Moreover, the court noted that the "defendants' disclosures conveyed to investors that its [model-derived] MBS valuations were far from certain. "440 Combined, the "[d]efendants' disclosure of the 'red flags' and
candidness about the uncertainty underlying its models neutralize[d] any scienter inference from 'red flags."' 441 The final allegation, common to multiple defendants, was that the size of the accounting error-the failure to record $1.62 billion as OTTI-contributed to a scienter inference. 442 The Fifth Circuit held that
"the magnitude's contribution to an inference of scienter is small, because the
valuation involved subjective accounting concepts that can yield a wide range
of reasonable results." 443

4 35. Id. at 538; id. at 542, 545 (identifying the positions that these individual defendants held).
4 36. Id. at 540.
4 37. Id. at 539-40 (expressing skepticism that such a "rare set of circumstances," Nathenson v.
Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 412 (5th Cir. 2001), could still exist in light of Goldstein v. MCI WorldCom, 340 F.3d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 2003))
4 38. Id. at 540.
4 39. Id. at 540-41.
440. Id. at 541.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id.
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Moving to allegations against (i) Guaranty's CEO and (ii) Guaranty's CFO, the
court noted the assertion that Guaranty's Senior Vice President of Investments
and Secretary of the Asset Liability Committee warned those two defendants
in January 2007 that Guaranty's model for valuing MBS was deficient in several
respects, including by use of outdated parameters. 444 Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit held that "[a] n inference of severe recklessness is more likely when a statement violates an objective rule than when GAAP permits a range of acceptable
outcomes," 445 and that it was "undeniable that there [was] some subjectivity
present in Guaranty's decision to continue using its internal models and to
delay recognizing impairments as other than temporary. "446 Further, the alleged
January 2007 warning failed to mention GAAP and did "not seem to suggest that
any issues were so severe that they could lead to a large overvaluation of the MBS
portfolio. "447 In addition, the defendants relied on AAA ratings on all of Guaranty's MBS, as did its regulator, the OTS. 448 While allowing that the plaintiffs
"c[a]me closest to alleging scienter by noting that [Guaranty's CEO and Guaranty's
CFO] continued to use the internal models even after the ratings agencies downgraded or placed some of Guaranty's MBS on negative watch," the court of appeals
pointed out that Guaranty "never purchased the most junior tranche of MBS,
meaning that there was a buffer before losses would begin to affect its portfocombin[ing]
lio. "449 Altogether, the appellate court saw only "allegations
poor business judgment with financial motive"-not enough to satisfy the high
pleading standard for scienter in private lawsuits. 450
The court found the scienter allegations against the remaining individual defendants even more deficient. As to Guaranty's Chairman, the plaintiffs did not
allege that he was ever told of warnings or internal disagreements over MBS valuation, and his "knowledge of Guaranty's undercapitalization and awareness of
the decline of the California real estate market [did] not rise to the level of a
'strong inference' of scienter that [was] at least as likely as the alternative inference that [this defendant] was merely negligent in believing that any decline was
temporary and would not affect Guaranty's AAA-rated securities. "451 As to a
fourth defendant-who had been Guaranty's Controller until December 2007,
when he became Guaranty's Executive Vice President and PAO-the plaintiffs
did not plead that he was told that the valuation models were deficient, 452
and, at bottom, sought to infer his scienter from his "position of [PAO] at the

444. Id. at 542.
445. Id. at 543.
446. Id. at 544.
44 7. Id.
448. Id. The Fifth Circuit noted that the Second Circuit had "held that UBS was not reckless in
relying on the assets' AAA rating in the face of internal and external uncertainty and disagreement
about the valuation of mortgage-related assets." Id. (citing City of Pontiac Policemen's & Firemen's
Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 187 (2d Cir. 2014)).
449. Id. at 545.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 546.
452. Id.
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time a large misstatement was made, and that red flags existed. "453 Having already
held that the size of the misstatement and the red flags were not enough as to other
defendants, the Fifth Circuit also found them insufficient as to this defendant. 454
Significance and analysis. Narrowly, Owens suggests difficulties in pleading
scienter where defendants in cases arising out of the financial crisis failed to
write down MBS in a timely way after limiting firm exposure to MBS (twentytwo percent of assets in Owens), buying only triple-A rated MBS, purchasing
only senior tranches so that defaults would only reach the securities the defendants bought after eating through more junior tranches, and relying on valuation
models (that necessarily involved judgments) at a time when there were no reliable market quotations for MBS. The notion seems to be that the entire financial
industry was caught by surprise when the valuations for such securities proved
far too generous. More broadly, Owens suggests that plaintiffs will find it difficult
to plead scienter in cases based on accounting errors where the defendants convince the court that the challenged numbers rested on judgments. 455

Misstatement of reason for failure of pending transaction. In Nahhhumpun v. Taylor, the plaintiff brought a Rule lOb-5 action based significantly on the statement
by Delta Petroleum Corporation's ("Delta") board chair, in a July 2010 press release, that Opon International LLC ("Opon") was not going forward with a previously announced purchase of a 3 7.5 percent non-operating interest in Delta's
Vega Area assets, at a price of $400 million. 456 The board chair said: "While
Opon was unable to arrange financing for a transaction on terms acceptable to
us, we remain confident in the value of our Vega Area asset [s], and intend to further delineate that value as we consider the Company's other strategic alternatives."457 Reversing the district court's dismissal of the complaint insofar as it
rested on this alleged misstatement, 458 the Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff
pled falsity by alleging that Opon's former CEO said Opon terminated the transaction, not because Opon failed to procure financing, but because Opon concluded that the 37.5 percent interest was not worth $400 million. 459
The court held that the plaintiff also adequately alleged the board chair's
scienter by pleading (i) that Opon's CEO had told plaintiff's counsel that
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. In three other decisions, two courts of appeals provided scienter rulings where plaintiffs asserted accounting fraud. The Eighth Circuit found no strong inference of scienter where an issuer
restated financial results only after lengthy discussions with the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance,
during which the company vigorously defended its decision to record pollution control outlays as
capital expenditures instead of current period expenses. Podraza v. Whiting, 790 F.3d 828, 83233 (8th Cir. 2015). The Second Circuit found scienter allegations insufficient in a case where the issuer made seriatum disclosures of internal control weaknesses. In re Magnum Hunter Res. Corp. Sec.
Litig., 616 F. App'x 442, 445-46 (2d Cir. 2015). That same court found that plaintiffs failed to allege
facts demonstrating that a defendant bank, or individuals there, intended to deceive by assurances
concerning risk management-given while a rogue trader was exposing the bank to billions in possible losses. Westchester Teamsters Pension Fund v. UBS AG, 604 F. App'x 5, 7-8 (2d Cir. 2015).
456. 782 F.3d 1142, 1145, 114 7 (10th Cir. 2015)
457. Id. at 114 7 (quoting press release).
458. Id. at 1162.
459. Id. at 1148.

Caselaw Developments 2015

1057

(a) Opon concluded, after conducting due diligence, that the interest was not
worth $400 million, (b) Opon had thereupon offered a lower price, and
(c) Opon's CEO had dealt directly with the Delta board chair in retracting the
$400 million offer; (ii) that Delta had previously advised the market on multiple
occasions of the pending deal, in communications that included the $400 million figure; and (iii) that therefore "fact-finders could reasonably infer that someone in [the Delta board chair's] situation would have recognized the risk of deceiving investors, who presumably would have attributed the impasse to Opon's
inability to obtain a loan rather than its unwillingness to pay $400 million for a
37.5% interest in the assets." 460 To the Tenth Circuit, the manner in which the
board chair phrased his comments ran the risk of Delta shareholders "believ[ing]
that Opon continued to value the 37.5% interest at $400 million" and that therefore the investors could "expect offers from other potential buyers with better
credit than Opon." 461 The court found that the plaintiff had pled "facts indicating that [the board chair] was at least reckless in disregarding the risk that his
statement would mislead existing and potential shareholders," with "reckless disregard of a substantial likelihood of misleading investors" sufficing for
scienter. 462

Significance and analysis. The defense argued that the board chair was simply
discharging his "fiduciary duty to obtain the highest price for the Vega Area assets"463 and that, if he mischaracterized the reason for Opon's termination, he
did so to preserve Delta's opportunity to obtain a high price for the assets
from another buyer. 464 The district court concluded that such a shareholderfocused motivation cut against scienter. 465 The Tenth Circuit, however, held
that, regardless of whether the board chair's statement was "intended to mislead
strategic partners rather than shareholders," the "statement created a risk of misleading shareholders to believe that at least one potential buyer had valued the
37.5% interest in the Vega assets at $400 million[, and t]his risk was readily apparent, creating an inference of scienter that was at least as strong as an inference
of innocence." 466 The upshot is that, with recklessness sufficing for scienter in all
circuits, 467 the executive or director who dissembles in a public statement in order
to help his or her company make more money may be liable under Rule lOb-5 if,
460. Id. at 1150-52; id. at 1152 (including quotation).
461. Id. at 1152.
462. Id. at 1150; id. at 1152 ('The risk of misleading investors would have been obvious."). The
Tenth Circuit reversed only as to the board chair, as the plaintiff had "not adequately pleaded culpability on the part of other defendants regarding the Opon transaction." Id. at 1157. The Tenth Circuit
also affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff's claim insofar as it rested on allegedly misleading statements
about Delta's financial condition, liquidity, and value in light of transactions in the industry-holding
as to those that the plaintiff failed to allege either falsity or scienter. Id. at 1157-62.
463. Id. at 1153.
464. Id. at 1152-53 (rejecting, legally and factually, "defendants['] argu[ment] that [the board
chair] lacked a motive to engage in securities fraud because his interests and Delta's were aligned
with the interests of shareholders").
465. Id. at 1149-50.
466. Id. at 1153.
467. See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
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despite this benign motivation, the executive or director is severely reckless with
respect to whether the statement will materially mislead shareholders. 468
Disclosures during long-running dialogue with FDA over off-label promotions. The
plaintiffs in Fire & Police Pension Ass'n of Colorado v. Abiomed, Inc. brought a
Rule lOb-5 action against Abiomed and its CEO and CFO that centered on Abiomed's promotion of its micro heart pump (the Impella 2.5) for uses other than
those for which the FDA had approved it. 469 In 2008, the FDA approved the Impella 2.5 "for partial circulatory support for up to six hours. "470 This meant that
Abiomed could respond to medical professionals' request to use the device for
other purposes, but could not market the pump for other uses. 471 In 2007, the
FDA granted Abiomed an investigational device exemption ("IDE") to test the Impella 2.5 against the intra-aortic balloon pump ("IABP") for use during angioplasties (high-risk percutaneous coronary interventions ("PCI")), and in 2008, the
FDA granted Abiomed an IDE to test the Impella 2.5 against the IABP in unstable
patients who were undergoing PCls due to heart attacks (acute myocardial infarctions ("AMis")). 472 The IDEs meant that Abiomed could use the pump for PCls
during the comparative studies but could not, during the studies, represent that
the Impella 2.5 was safe and effective for PCls. 473
The FDA sent Abiomed an Untitled Letter on January 28, 2010, stating that
Abiomed had improperly promoted the Impella 2.5 for use in high-risk PCls
and AMis. 474 After Abiomed acknowledged that it had made improper efficacy
468. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff pied loss causation under "a theory of 'materialization of a concealed risk."' Nahhhumpun, 782 F.3d at 1153 (quoting from and agreeing with district
court). The board chair's statement "concealed the risk that 'the Vega Assets were not marketable
at or near the $400 million price."' Id. at 1154 (quoting district court). That risk was foreseeable because, "[i]f Opon decided (after conducting its due diligence) that a 37.5% non-operating interest in
the assets was not worth $400 million, Delta might not find any other potential buyers willing to pay
$400 million." Id. The "risk materialized on November 9, 2011, when Delta disclosed its inability to
find a buyer." Id. at 1155. Delta's stock declined after that announcement, and the defendants offered
no "intervening events that would show disruption of the causal link [between the announcement
and the stock decline] as a matter of law." Id. at 1156.
Three additional 2015 opinions addressed scienter in financial cases that did not center on accounting. The Second Circuit held that plaintiffs adequately pied scienter where they alleged that
management represented the issuer was struggling to keep up with demand when, in fact, the company was swamped with unsold inventory that it was hiding from auditors. Emps.' Ret. Sys. of Gov't
of the V.I. v. Blanford, 794 F.3d 297, 300-02 (2d Cir. 2015). In Lucas v. Icahn, 616 F. App'x 448,
450 (2d Cir. 2015), the same court ruled that, even assuming an issuer's description of a transaction
was false with respect to the value of one component (an assumption the court found difficult to accept), the issuer's disclosure of "all the information an investor would need to perform a valuation"
was "flatly inconsistent with an intent to mislead investors." The Tenth Circuit found scienter allegations inadequate in a case where plaintiffs alleged that an issuer failed to footnote its ownership tables
to disclose a CEO's pledge of stock, but the CEO disclosed, in Rule 144 and Form 4 filings, that his
pledged stock was sold to meet margin calls. In re ZAGG, Inc. Sec. Litig., 797 F.3d 1194, 1197,
1198-99, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2015)
469. 778 F.3d 228, 231-32 (1st Cir. 2015)
4 70. Id. at 233.
4 71. Id. at 232-33.
4 72. Id. at 233.
4 73. Id. at 232-33.
4 74. Id. at 233. An Untitled Letter addresses "regulatory violations that do not meet the threshold
for regulatory significance warranting a Warning Letter." Id.
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claims, the company stated that it would revise its promotional materials, had
enhanced its review of promotional materials, and had made other changes. 475
The FDA told Abiomed on April 20, 2010, that the company's "'response appear[ed] adequate' and that no further action was necessary." 476 Abiomed did
not disclose this regulatory exchange. 477
On June 10, 2011, the FDA sent Abiomed a formal Warning Letter, complaining that the company's "marketing materials continued to improperly compare
the Impella 2.5 to the IABP and promote the device for non-cleared uses." 478
The FDA posted this letter on its website. 479 Abiomed conducted a "clarification
call" with the FDA in July, then formally responded in August that it would pull
the advertisement to which the FDA objected, remove from its website materials
relating to a medical conference at which the company claimed that the Impella
2.5 could improve cardiac output in AMI shock patients, and implement a plan
to prevent further violations. 480 In April 2012, the FDA told Abiomed that the
company was still engaged in improper marketing-referring among other
things to videos on the Abiomedimpella YouTube channel, which discussed unapproved uses of the Impella 2.5, a link on the Abiomed website to "Patient
Stories" about unapproved uses of the pump, and comments by the Abiomed
CEO during a Mad Money appearance suggesting that the Impella 2.5 could
be used during heart attacks. 481 Following an August 7, 2012, meeting between
Abiomed and the FDA, the FDA conducted a compliance audit at the company,
and Abiomed simultaneously conducted its own internal audit. 482 On August 20,
2012, Abiomed wrote a letter to the FDA saying "that it understood its prior approach to compliance was 'too narrow in focus' and so was 'adopting a broad, systemic approach to address the issues raised by [the] FDA,"' and that the company
was "destroy[ing] the Impella marketing brochures cited by [the] FDA, stopp[ing]
distribution of all marketing labeling, recall[ing] all marketing labeling held by
Abiomed field personnel, and stopp[ing] any planned updates to all labeling
and the [Abiomed] website." 483
On November 1, 2012, Abiomed disclosed the FDA compliance audit and an
investigation by a U.S. Attorney into Abiomed's advertising and promotions. 484
The company's stock price dropped by thirty-two percent. 485 By a February 19,

4 75. Id. at 233-34.
476. Id. at 234 (quoting FDA letter).
477. Id.
4 78. Id. (quoting FDA letter).
479. Id. A Warning Letter "is a step above an Untitled Letter in the FDA's enforcement hierarchy."
Id. at 234. It "communicates that the FDA believes the regulated entity has committed a violation of
regulatory significance but does not commit the FDA to taking enforcement action." Id.
480. Id. at 234-35.
481. Id. at 235.
482. Id. at 236.
483. Id. (quoting Abiomed's letter).
484. Id. at 236-37.
485. Id. at 237.
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2013 close-out letter, the FDA advised Abiomed that it had taken adequate corrective action, and the company's stock price subsequently recovered. 486
Plaintiffs alleged that throughout the period from August 4, 2011, to October 31,
2012, the defendants, among other things, made half-hearted corrective efforts to
hold the FDA at bay while fraudulently (i) reporting revenues and earnings in press
releases, conference calls, and SEC filings, without disclosing that the company
produced those financial results by improper promotional activities, 487 and (ii) representing that it had a policy against off-label marketing, and that it was
cooperating with the FDA, while the company was actually engaging in widespread management-directed off-label marketing and promotion. 488 Affirming dismissal of the complaint, the First Circuit held that the plaintiffs had failed to plead
facts supporting a strong inference of scienter. 489
As to the alleged fraud in reporting the financial results without connecting
them to illegal marketing, the First Circuit noted the connection between materiality and scienter-in particular that, "[i]f it is questionable whether a fact is
material or its materiality is marginal, that tends to undercut the argument
that defendants acted with the requisite intent or extreme recklessness in not
disclosing the fact. "490 In Abiomed, the plaintiffs did "not state or even suggest
what proportion of sales were made as a result of [prohibited promotional] efforts, or the significance of the contribution of those sales to Abiomed's stock
price," so that "[t] he marginal materiality of the alleged statements and omissions
concerning revenues weighs against an argument that defendants . . possessed
the requisite scienter." 491 Moreover, "Abiomed explicitly warned investors both
(a) that the FDA might disagree with the company's assessment of the legality
of its marketing practices and (b) that, if the FDA took enforcement action
against [Abiomed], that 'could result in reduced demand for our products and
would have a material adverse effect on our operations and prospects."' 492
Also weighing against a scienter inference were that the company "did not withhold information about the FDA's concerns once the FDA issued a Warning Letter" and "stated repeatedly throughout the Class Period that the FDA 'could dis-

486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 237-38 (with plaintiffs pointing to representations in passages contained in 10-Qs and
a 10-K quoted at 238).
489. Id. at 231-32, 24 7.
490. Id. at 242 (quoting City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Waters Corp.,
632 F.3d 751, 757 (1st Cir. 2011))
491. Id. at 24 3. The court noted that it would have to indulge a series of inferences to find that the
improper marketing materially affected revenues and earnings-that a substantial proportion of the
company's total revenues derived from sale of the Impella 2.5 as opposed to other Impella products;
that a substantial proportion of Impella 2.5 sales resulted from sales of that pump for off-label use;
that a substantial portion of the Impella 2.5 sales for off-label use resulted from improper off-label
marketing; and that those sales were "substantial enough to have a material effect on the stock
price." Id. at 242-43. For another 2015 decision relating materiality to scienter, see supra notes
296-311 and accompanying text.
492. Abiomed, Inc., 778 F.3d at 24 3 (quoting Abiomed's 10-K, filed on June 4, 2012); see id. at 238
(quoting Abiomed's SEC filings more fully).
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agree [with Abiomed's position that its marketing was lawful] and conclude that
[it had] engaged in off-label promotion."' 493 Those were "not the actions of a
company bent on deceiving investors as to
future earnings prospects. "494
Turning to the alleged fraud through deceptive statements that the company
had a policy against off-label marketing and that it was cooperating with the
FDA, the First Circuit focused on the defendants' careful wording in public statements, where Abiomed said that "its policy was to 'refrain from statements that
could be considered off-label promotion,' but that the FDA could disagree with
Abiomed's view on that question; and that, while it 'believe[d]' the issue had
been resolved, it could come up again in the future and could entail 'significant
consequences."' 495 Thus, even if the defendants, in fact, had a policy or practice
that generated improper off-label marketing (while they mistakenly believed the
advertising was legal), and even if, in fact, the dispute with the FDA had not
been resolved (while they mistakenly believed it was), those facts did not raise
the requisite inference that the defendants lied to investors. 496 As to the statements about company cooperation with the FDA, the court viewed Abiomed's
requests to meet with the FDA and the FDA's ultimate conclusion to close out
the off-label marketing correspondence to support the inference that the company "was not involved in a scheme to defraud investors but rather in finding
a solution amenable to the FDA while meeting its need to market its products." 497
Significance and analysis. Abiomed contains some very issuer-friendly language.
In particular, the First Circuit rejected the notion that the company "should have
affirmatively admitted widespread wrongdoing rather than stating that the outcome of its regulatory back-and-forth with the FDA was uncertain." 498 The
court posited that "[t]here must be some room for give and take between a regulated entity and its regulator." 499 Moreover, the court parsed the company's
statements in a manner quite favorable to the defendants, emphasizing that
the company said that the FDA might disagree with the company's conclusion
that its marketing was within legal limits and that, while the company believed
at one point that it had resolved the matter with the agency, the matter might surface again. Note, however, that the court of appeals provided all of this defendantsupportive prose against the backdrop of the FDA ultimately having decided that
493. Id. at 24 3 (quoting a statement, some version of which appeared in Abiomed's 10-Qs for the
first, second, and third quarters of 2012); see id. at 238 (quoting Abiomed's SEC filings more fully).
494. Id. at 243.
495. Id. at 244 (quoting a statement, some version of which appeared in Abiomed's 10-Qs for the
first, second, and third quarters of 2012); see id. at 238 (quoting Abiomed's SEC filings more fully).
496. Id. at 244. Indeed, the First Circuit assumed, for purposes of its analysis, that Abiomed had a
policy or practice that in fact produced improper off-label promotion. Id.
497. Id. The court added that Abiomed's statements about its device were aimed at customers and
not investors. Id. at 245. Moreover, the First Circuit brushed aside the complaint's reference to confidential witness statements, noting that some of those witnesses had not worked at Abiomed during
the class period and others failed to provide the time period to which their statements referred. Id.
The court found their statements collectively "undermined by the fact that the FDA eventually closed
out its investigation of Abiomed without taking any action adverse to the company." Id.
498. Id. at 244.
499. Id.
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Abiomed had done enough to warrant closing out its off-label marketing concerns
without imposing any penalty. 50 Companies should not assume that courts will
take this approach in a case where the agency ultimately sanctions the issuer. In
those cases, defendants can expect much closer scrutiny of whether the public representations of law-abiding behavior had a substantial basis and whether any
qualifications deliberately created an impression that the government scrutiny was
not as serious as it was.
Omissions of negative information from summaries of FDA communications. Chelsea Therapeutics International, Ltd. ("Chelsea") conducted four clinical studies
of a drug to treat neurogenic orthostatic hypotension, which results from low
blood pressure when a person stands up, producing dizziness and weakness. 501
Chelsea labeled the studies 301, 302, 303, and 306. 502 Chelsea began the 301
and 302 studies in 2008. 503 The complaint alleged that the 302 study failed
to show a statistically significant effect on lightheadedness and dizziness and
that the 303 study did not meet its endpoint and failed to demonstrate any
"duration effect" on symptoms. 504 The company halted the 306 study after an
interim analysis suggested that it would not meet its endpoint. sos The case centered on Chelsea's efforts to win approval for its drug through the 301 study,
supplemented with data from the 302 study.
After Chelsea announced the 302 study results to investors and agreed, in
November 2009, with the FDA to modify the assessment scale for the ongoing
301 study, the company stated in September 2010 that the 301 study had demonstrated statistically significant improvement in participants' symptoms. 506 The
special protocol assessment for the 301 study "stated that the FDA expected two
successful efficacy studies before it would grant regulatory approval of the new
drug." 507 The FDA told Chelsea, in a meeting on December 10, 2010, "that a
single successful study typically was not sufficient to support approval of a
new drug." 508 Nonetheless, Chelsea announced that the FDA had "agreed"
that Chelsa, without any further studies, could submit a new drug application
on the basis of the 301 study, together with data from the 302 study. 509 Moreover, on a conference call with investors, Chelsea's CEO characterized the
December 10 meeting with the FDA as a "'successful outcome' that 'reflect[ed]
the strength of the data,"' reaffirming in the same call "that the FDA officials
had clarified 'that additional efficacy studies were not required' for a new drug
application filing. "510

°

500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.

Id. at 237, 245.
Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int'!, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 601 (4th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 601-02.
Id. at 602.
Id.
Id. at 601-02.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 602, 614 (quoting press release).
Id. at 602 (quoting CEO).
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After Chelsea submitted its new drug application, an FDA staffer prepared a
briefing document for the FDA's Cardiovascular and Renal Drugs Advisory Committee in which the staffer recommended against approval in part because the
application did not show a "durable effect (i.e., more than 4 weeks)." 511 On February 13, 2012, Chelsea issued a press release stating that the briefing document
raised "several lines of inquiry ... as [to] significant components of the benefitrisk analysis of [the drug]" because the evidence that Chelsea submitted to the
FDA "'may not adequately establish a durable treatment effect as a result of
the short duration of' the clinical trials." 512 The press release did not disclose,
however, that the briefing document recommended against approving the
drug. 513 The FDA made the document available on its website eight days after
Chelsea issued its press release. 514 Chelsea's stock price declined after the press
release and again after the FDA released the briefing document. 515 On February
23, 2012, the FDA advisory committee announced that it recommended approving the drug, although virtually all members concluded that the failed studies did
not provide "confirmatory evidence of benefit[ a]nd ... [the] 301 [Study] also did
not provide evidence regarding the duration of effect in any direct way." 516 The
FDA denied the drug application on March 28, 2012. 517
On behalf of all those who bought Chelsea stock between November 3, 2008,
and March 28, 2012, the plaintiffs brought a Rule lOb-5 case against Chelsea
and four executives. 518 Vacating and remanding the district court's dismissal,
the Fourth Circuit focused on whether the complaint alleged facts raising a
strong inference that the defendants (i) "intentionally or recklessly failed to disclose that the FDA expected Chelsea to produce two successful studies showing
evidence of durability of effect," and (ii) "intentionally misled investors in the
February 13, 2012, press release, by failing to disclose that the FDA briefing
document included a recommendation against approval." 519 Taking the allegations of the complaint as true for purposes of evaluating the dismissal below,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that, even if Chelsea's announcement after the December 10, 2010, meeting with the FDA correctly stated that the FDA could submit a new drug application based on one completed study that showed efficacy,
Chelsea's announcement "was misleading given the FDA's continuing expectation that two successful efficacy studies would be required for approval of
[the drug]. "520 In addition, the complaint alleged that "Chelsea was aware of
Study 301 and Study 302's durational-benefit shortcomings. "521 Further, the
511.
512.
513
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 603 (quoting briefing document).
(quoting press release).

(quoting advisory committee chair).
at 600 n.l, 603.
at 608, 611.
at 609.
(quoting complaint).
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omission of the adverse FDA staffer's recommendation in Chelsea's description
of the pre-advisory committee briefing "when viewed in the context of the
known problems of the efficacy studies and Chelsea's earlier remarks regarding
those studies, supports the inference that Chelsea intentionally or recklessly misled investors." 522 Together, the allegations "permit[ted] a strong inference that
the defendants either knowingly or recklessly misled investors by failing to disclose critical information received from the FDA during the new drug application process, while releasing less damaging information that they knew was
incomplete. "523

Significance and analysis. Chelsea was a two-to-one decision, with the dissent
pointing out that (i) federal law expressly permits the FDA to approve a drug
based on a single study; 524 (ii) the CEO stated in a December 2010 conference
call "that the FDA had expressed an interest in seeing 'two additional studies'";525 and (iii) Chelsea did not depend solely on the 301 study when submitting its application for drug approval but also on supplemental data from the 302
study. 526 The dissent also noted that (i) Chelsea set out in a September 30, 2011,
quarterly report "numerous reasons why the FDA 'may not accept or approve' the
[drug] application"; 527 and (ii) Chelsea warned in its press release describing
the pre-advisory committee briefing that the briefing raised questions regarding
the drug's benefit-risk analysis. 528 The most important message from the majority
opinion therefore is that even specific warnings like these may not suffice where
a drug or device company (i) describes a communication with, or analysis from,
the FDA, such as the briefing document that Chelsea obtained before the FDA
made it public, but (ii) fails to include in the description particular adverse comments that the FDA made in that very communication or analysis, such as the briefing paper's recommendation against drug approval.5 29
Imputation of officer scienter to corporation. In re ChinaCast Education Corp. Securities Litigation provided the Ninth Circuit with the opportunity to address imputation of scienter from a corporate officer to a corporate defendant. 530 The
complaint included a Rule lOb-5 claim against ChinaCast Education Corporation based on assurances from its CEO-while he was looting the company

522. Id. at 610.
523 Id.
524. Id. at 614 (Thacker,]., dissenting) ("[F]ederal law expressly authorizes the FDA to make the
requisite finding of 'substantial evidence' based solely on 'data from one adequate and well-controlled
clinical investigation and confirmatory evidence (obtained prior to or after such investigation .... ")
(quoting 21 USC § 355(d) (2012)))
525. Id. at 615 (quoting CEO).
526. Id. at 614-15.
527. Id. at 615 (quoting quarterly report).
528. Id.
529. In one other life sciences case last year, the Third Circuit found scienter allegations insufficient where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants recklessly disregarded (i) an asserted FDA requirement that results from a clinical test meet a particular p statistic test and (ii) an asserted need
to show statistical significance in results from a U.S. subgroup alone. In re Columbia Labs., Inc.,
Sec. Litig., 602 F. App'x 80, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2015).
530. 809 F.3d 471, 472 (9th Cir. 2015)
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by, among other things, transferring $120 million of assets to accounts that he
and his allies controlled-that the company enjoyed financial health and stability
and that "no questions or concern[s] have ever been raised by the company's auditors or audit committee about [the company's] cash balances." 531 The complaint also alleged that the CEO committed fraud by signing SEC filings for
the company without disclosing his defalcations. 532 The district court dismissed
the case, holding that the CEO's scienter could not be imputed to the corporation because the CEO had been acting adversely to the corporation, to benefit
himself rather than to benefit the corporation in any way. 533
In reversing, 534 the Ninth Circuit reprised that, "[i]n the context of Rule lOb-5,
[it had] adopted the general rule of imputation and held that a corporation is responsible for a corporate officer's fraud committed 'within the scope of his employment' or 'for a misleading statement made by an employee or other agent
who has actual or apparent authority."' 535 While not disputing that the CEO
had "acted within the scope of his apparent authority," the corporation relied
on the "adverse interest" exception to the rule that an agent's state of mind is imputed to a principal-an exception by which "a rogue agent's ... knowledge [is]
'not imputed to the principal if the agent acts adversely to the principal in a transaction or matter, intending to act solely for the agent's own purposes or those of
another person."' 536 The Ninth Circuit, however, invoked the exception to this exception, namely that "the adverse interest rule collapses in the face of an innocent
third party who relies on the agent's apparent authority." 537 Here, the complaint
pled facts sufficient to impute the CEO's scienter to the corporation because the
complaint "allege[d] that third-party shareholders understandably relied on [the
CEO's] representations, which were made with the imprimatur of the corporation
that selected him to speak on its behalf and sign SEC filings. "538
Significance and analysis. Circuit decisions seem to converge on the rule that in a
Rule lOb-5 case corporate scienter requires scienter on the part of the individuals
inside the corporation who, acting within their authority, author or speak the challenged statements. 539 If such an individual had scienter and spoke or wrote with
even apparent authority of the company, it seems unlikely, in light of ChinaCast,
that the company can defend on the basis that the individual was not seeking by
the fraud to benefit the company but only to put money into his or her own pocket.

531. Id. at 473 (quoting press release and conference call from fall 2011) (first alteration by appellate court).
532. Id.
533. Id. at 474.
534. Id. at 473, 479.
535. Id. at 476 (quoting Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.28 (9th Cir.
1990) (en bane)).
536. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 5.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006)). The court of appeals
noted that "this is a question of federal securities law, albeit one guided by (common law) agency
principles." Id. at 475 n.4.
537. Id. at 477.
538. Id.
539. See Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004).
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Scienter does not require intent to harm. While scienter includes intent to deceive or severe recklessness with respect to deception, 540 the Second Circuit
held in United States v. Litvak that proof of scienter does not require intent to
harm. 541 Although Litvak case was a criminal prosecution, scienter is an element
common to both government enforcement actions 542 and private Rule lOb-5
lawsuits. 543 Therefore the holding should apply to both.
PRIMARY VIOLATION OF RULE

10b-5(b)

Rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful for any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security in interstate commerce, "(a) [t] o employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. "544 In ]anus Capital
Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, the Supreme Court held that only "the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content
and whether and how to communicate it" "make[s]" a statement for purposes
of subsection (b). 545 Because there is no aiding and abetting liability in a private
Rule lOb-5 action, Janus means that only "maker[s]" of a statement can be liable
in a private action brought under subsection (b). 546
In ]anus, the Court held that an investment adviser did not "make" the statements in prospectuses for mutual funds it managed because the funds, rather
than the adviser, had ultimate authority over the content and dissemination of
the prospectuses. 547 In reaching that conclusion, the Court observed that the
business trust containing the funds was a separate legal entity from the adviser
540. See supra notes 357-58 and accompanying text.
541. 808 F.3d 160, 179 (2d Cir. 2015) ('"[I]ntent to harm' is not a component of the scienter element of securities fraud under Section lO(b) .... ").The Second Circuit distinguished mail fraud. Id.
at 178-79; see supra notes 312-31 and accompanying text (discussing the Litvak case generally).
Further as to scienter, the trial court had instructed the jury: "if you find that Mr. Litvak acted in
good faith, or held an honest belief that his actions (as charged in a given count) were proper and not
in furtherance of any unlawful activity, you cannot convict him of that count." Litvak, 808 F.3d at 189
(quoting jury instruction). The lower court permitted Mr. Litvak "to adduce evidence that his supervisors 'approved' or 'encouraged' him to misrepresent price, cost, or a seller's identity" as that could
cut against a conclusion that he intended to defraud. Id. at 188 (quoting joint appendix). The district
court, however, excluded evidence "of Jefferies managers', including Litvak's supervisors, knowledge
or approval of other employees' similar conduct" on the ground that such evidence would "improperly
'suggest that everybody did it and therefore it isn't illegal."' Id. (quoting joint appendix); id. at 189-90
& n.35 (quoting district court) (emphasis by appellate court). The Second Circuit held this exclusion
"exceeded [the district court's] allowable discretion," as this testimony was relevant to intent to defraud "under the low threshold set ... by Federal Rule of Evidence 401." Id. at 190.
542. Id. at 178.
54 3. Dura Pharms. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
544. 17 CFR. § 240.lOb-5 (2015)
545. 131 s Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011)
546. Id. at 2302. Plaintiffs can pursue others as "control persons." Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)
(2012)
54 7. ]anus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304.
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and had an independent board. s 4 s The Court therefore left open whether the
rule it announced in Janus would apply when the defendant was not a separate
legal entity but an officer of a corporation issuing an allegedly fraudulent
statement.
In Glichenhaus & Co. v. Household International, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held
that Janus does apply to individuals inside a company.s 49 The misstatements concerned lending practices, delinquency rates, and earnings from credit-card agreements. sso A jury found the corporation and three individual defendants (the
CEO, the CFO, and the vice-chair and president of consumer lending) liable
after a trial.ssi The company stipulated that it had "made" all of the challenged
statements in its SEC filings and press releases, and the Seventh Circuit held that
the corporate defendant also made the "statements delivered by the three executives" because "[n]othing in Janus undid the longstanding rule that '[a] corporation is liable for statements by employees who have apparent authority to make
them."'ss2
The trial court, however, instructed the jury that it could also hold an individual defendant liable on a statement if the plaintiffs "proved that the [individual]
defendant 'made, approved, or furnished information to be included in a false statement'" and denied a new trial motion that the individual defendants based on the
then-recent ]anus opinion, reasoning that ]anus "applied only to legally independent third parties .
, not to corporate insiders. "ss 3 The Seventh Circuit ruled
"[t]hat was error" and held that "[n]othing in Janus limits its holding to legally
independent third parties," so that "[t]he instruction plainly misstated the
law. "ss 4 The circuit court then proceeded to apply ]anus to the three executives.
The CEO conceded that he had "made" the statements in the company's SEC
filings and his own presentation to Goldman Sachs.sss This left open whether he
"made" statements in the company's press releases. Because no evidence showed
that the CEO signed the press releases or that his "name appeared in the press
releases in the sense of an attribution" or that the CEO "actually delivered the
statements in the press releases himself-say, for example, by reading them at
a press conference"-the court of appeals held that the CEO was entitled to a
new trial for his liability for those statements. ss 6 At that trial, plaintiffs would
have to prove that the CEO "actually exercised control over the content of the
press releases and whether and how they were communicated," which is "an in-

548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
2008));
defined
553.
554.
555.
556.

Id. at 2299.
787 F.3d 408, 424-29 (7th Cir. 2015)
Id. at 413.
Id. at 412, 426.
Id. at 426 (quoting Makar Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir.
id. at 413 (holding that the corporate defendant "itself 'made' all the false statements, as ]anus
that term").
Id. at 425 (quoting jury instructions) (emphasis by appellate court).
Id.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 426-27.
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herently fact-bound inquiry." 557 The court, however, held that the CEO was not
prejudiced by the faulty instruction insofar as he was held liable for a false statement made by the vice-chairman/president of consumer lending because the
CEO had "drafted the statement" and sent it to other executives with an email
saying: "Attached ... is our media holding statement." 558 The vice-chair/president
of consumer lending "simply read the statement verbatim to the media." 559 Because "the CEO [was] the actual author of the statement, [he] had the 'ultimate
authority' over its content and whether and how to communicate it, the touchstone of ]anus. "560 Accordingly, he could be liable for the statement, as could
the vice-chair/president of consumer lending too, as "[n]othing injanus precludes
a single statement from having multiple makers. "561
The CFO also conceded that he "made" the statements in an SEC filing and in
his own presentation at an investor relations conference. 562 He, too, however
was entitled to a new trial on liability for statements in the press releases,
under the same actual control standard applicable to the CE0. 563 The vicechair/president of consumer lending was liable for the one statement that he
read to the media himself, but was entitled to a new trial on his liability for statements in the SEC filings and press releases. 564
DAMAGES,

Loss

CAUSATION, AND RELIANCE IN OPEN

MARKET CASES 565

Plaintiffs in a private Rule lOb-5 action must prove reliance, economic loss
(damages), and loss causation. 566 The three elements interact in an open market
case because plaintiffs prove them all through the effect of misstatements and
corrective disclosures on securities prices. 567 Two opinions dealt with that interaction in 2015. The Seventh Circuit set out a rule that, where the plaintiff is
proving loss causation and damages by a model that computes the amount of
inflation based on the difference between actual returns and returns estimated
by the relationship between the stock price at issue and market or industry in557. Id. at 42 7. The court commented that it was "hesitant to hold as a matter of law that a CEO
'makes' all statements contained in a company press release, as that term was narrowly defined in
]anus." Id. at 426.
558. Id. at 427 (first quoting appellate court; then quoting CEO's email).
559. Id.
560. Id. (quoting Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302
(2011))
561. Id.
562. Id. at 428.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. In a decision involving a face-to-face transaction, rather than open market trading, the Sixth
Circuit held that a plaintiff's reliance on misrepresentations was unjustified where the plaintiff did
not read the relevant documents before signing them and those documents provided the truth.
Bender v. Logan, 608 F. App'x 356, 360-63 (6th Cir. 2015).
566. Dura Pharms. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005); see also 15 U.5.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)
(2012) (requiring that private plaintiff prove loss causation).
567. See William 0. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do justice in a Time of Madness7, 54 EMORY LJ. 843, 874-83 (2005).
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dices, the model may go to a jury if the plaintiff's expert testifies in nonconclusory terms that no company-specific non-fraud information influenced the
calculations, shifting the burden of identifying such information to the defense,
after which-if the defense presents such information-the burden shifts backs
to the plaintiff to account for that information. 568 In the same case, the Seventh
Circuit approved protocols by which a district court, following trial of class-wide
issues, provided the defendants with an opportunity to test whether individual
members of the class relied on the integrity of the market. 569 The Fifth Circuit
found no abuse in the certification of one class in the Gulf oil spill securities
case, holding that any quarrel over whether particular disclosures were "corrective" raised questions common to the class, and found no abuse in denial of certification of a second class, in which recovery depended on whether individual
class members would have purchased the issuer's securities at all if they had
known the risk created by the company's unpreparedness to deal with a deep
water blowout. 570
In Glichenhaus & Co. v. Household International, Inc., the Seventh Circuit addressed both reliance and loss causation in a rare case that was tried to a jury
verdict, resulting in a $2.46 billion judgment. 571 The court of appeals ordered
a new trial on loss causation, but found no error in the lower court's treatment
of reliance. 572
Loss causation when the truth leahs out over time. Plaintiffs alleged that the corporate defendant and its executives had inflated the price of the Household International, Inc. ("Household") stock by making false statements about the company's lending practices, the delinquency rates on loans it had made, and its
earnings from credit-card agreements. 573 The jury found seventeen actionable
misrepresentations. 57 4
Loss causation required the plaintiffs to prove "that the price of the securities
they purchased was 'inflated'"-with "the best way to determine the impact of a
false statement" on price being "to observe what happens when the truth is finally disclosed and use that to work backward, on the assumption that the
lie's positive effect on the share price is equal to the additive inverse of the truth's
negative effect. "575 The plaintiffs' expert presented two different economic models with which to accomplish that task. 576 The jury selected the "leakage" model,
which assumed that the truth leaked out over the class period, and calculated the

568. See infra notes 575-90 and accompanying text (discussing loss causation and burden shifting); see also infra notes 571-604 and accompanying text (discussing the case generally).
569. See infra notes 591-604 and accompanying text (discussing rebuttal of presumption of reliance); see also infra notes 571-604 (discussing the case generally).
570. See infra notes 605-28 and accompanying text.
571. 787 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 2015)
572. Id. at 433. The Seventh Circuit also ordered a new trial on the responsibility of individual
defendants for certain company statements. See supra notes 544-64 and accompanying text.
573. Glichenhaus, 787 F .3d at 413.
574. Id. at 414.
575. Id. at 415.
576. Id. at 415-16
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inflation caused by the fraud, on each trading day, as the difference (called the
"residual") between the actual Household stock price on that day and the price
for that day as predicted by a regression analysis built on the relationship between the historical movement of Household's stock price and the movement
of the S&P 500 and the S&P 500 Financials lndex. 577 Using this model, the
"amount the stock is overpriced on any given day is the sum of all subsequent
residual returns. "578 Thus, because the residuals totaled $23. 94, that was the
amount by which the stock was overpriced on the first day of the fraud, with
that amount declining as the truth leaked out and the price of the company's
stock fell lower relative to the two indices. 579
On appeal, the defendants attacked the leakage model in three ways. First,
they argued that, because the stock price on the first day of the fraud increased
by only $3.40/share and the regression analysis reflected a residual on that day of
only $0.67, the fraud could not possibly have inflated the price of the stock by
$23.94 at that time. 580 The court rejected this argument because the question
was not the amount by which the first fraudulent statement increased the
price of the stock but the price to which the stock would have fallen if the
full truth had been known on the first day. 581
The defendants' second argument fared better. They pointed out that the regression analysis controlled only for general market trends (by using the S&P
500 index) and industry-specific trends (by using the S&P 500 Financials
Index) but not for nonfraudulent company-specific news. 582 The plaintiffs' expert testified generally that "he looked for company-specific factors during the
relevant period and did not find any significant trend of positive or negative information apart from the fraud-related disclosures. "583 The defendants contended that this was inadequate and that the plaintiffs needed to affirmatively
"eliminate any firm-specific, nonfraud related factors that might have contributed to the stock's decline." 584 Noting that the defendants did not identify any
such information that "could have significantly distorted the [plaintiffs']
model," 585 the Seventh Circuit provided the following rule:

577. Id. at 416-17. The Financials Index was relevant because Household's "business centered on
consumer lending-mortgages, home-equity loans, auto financing, and credit-card loans." Id. at 413.
578. Id. at 416.
579. Id. at 416-17.
580. Id. at 417.
581. Id. at 417-18. The court reasoned:
As soon as the first false statement was made, that overpricing became fully attributable to the
false statement, even if the stock price didn't change at all, because had the statement been truthful, the price would have gone down by $23.94-after all, that's what it did once the truth was
fully revealed .

Id. at 417-18; see also id. at 419 (noting that a false statement that does not raise the price of stock,
but keeps it at an inflated level, can cause loss).
582. Id. at 419.
583. Id.
584. Id. at 420.
585. Id. at 422.
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If the plaintiffs' expert testifies that no firm-specific, nonfraud related information

contributed to the decline in stock price during the relevant time period and explains in nonconclusory terms the basis for this opinion, then it's reasonable to
expect the defendants to shoulder the burden of identifying some significant,
firm-specific, nonfraud related information that could have affected the stock
price. If they can't, then the leakage model can go to the Jury; if they can, then
the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs to account for that specific information or
provide a loss-causation model that doesn't suffer from the same problem .
One possible way to address the issue is to simply exclude from the model's calculation any days identified by the defendants on which significant, firm-specific, nonfraud related information was released. 586
Because the leakage model did not account for the possibility that firm-specific,
nonfraudulent information affected the defendant company's stock price, and
because "the expert's general statement that any such information was insignificant .
[was] not enough," the court ordered a new trial on the issue of loss
causation, to be conducted according to the rule set out above. 587
Third and finally, the defendants argued that the leakage model purported to
prove loss caused by all three categories of misrepresentations (lending practices,
delinquency rates, and earnings from credit-card agreements), while the first
misstatement dealt only with lending practices. 588 The court of appeals suggested that this problem be solved by "instruct[ing] the jurors that if the first actionable misrepresentation relates only to one or two of the three categories of
fraud, they should find zero inflation in the stock (or some fraction of the
model they've chosen) until there are actionable misrepresentations addressing
all three." 589
Significance and analysis. Much of the Glichenhaus reasoning seems confused
because the court fails to separate loss causation from damages. Properly analyzed, loss causation requires only that the fraud caused loss, while damages focuses on the amount of loss caused by the fraud. Accordingly, a plaintiff proves
loss causation by showing that the fraud was a substantial reason for the plaintiff's loss, even if other factors also contributed. A plaintiff, however, can recover
damages attributable to the fraud alone and so must, for damages proof, show
the loss that he or she suffered after isolating and removing any loss appropriately attributed to other factors. 590 The doctrinal mixup is important. Plaintiffs
have the burden of proof on both elements. Thus, on damages, plaintiffs must
prove the amount of price inflation caused by the fraud on each day of the class period. The court's rule may effectively create a damages presumption in favor of an
expert model that the defendants must refute, thus disturbing the proof burden.
Rebutting the reliance presumption in the second phase of a fraud-on-the-market
case. The Glichenhaus trial court divided the case into two phases, with the
586.
587.
588.
589.
590.

Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 423.
Id.
Id. at 424.
See Miller v. Asensio & Co., 364 F.3d 223, 228-33 (4th Cir. 2004).
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first devoted to questions common to the plaintiff class, and the second addressing reliance issues for individual class members by permitting the defense to
rebut a class-wide reliance presumption. 591 The plaintiffs invoked the fraudon-the-market ("FOTM") presumption that stock purchasers rely on misstatements, even if those purchasers never hear or read them, because the purchasers
rely on the integrity of the market prices that impound the information made
public in those misstatements. 592 The presumption can be rebutted by "[a]ny
showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either
the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price." 593 The district court determined that-in the second phase here-the
only method of rebuttal available to the defense was that "individual plaintiffs
bought or sold Household stock without relying on the integrity of the market."594 Accordingly, the judge required each class member to answer a written
question asking whether the class member would still have purchased the stock
if the member had known that defendants' false statements had inflated the
price. 595 When some members failed to respond, the court allowed the plaintiffs
to send out the question again. 596 The judge also permitted defendants to depose
up to fifteen class members (the defendants deposed twelve) and to serve written
discovery (which defendants sent to about 100 class members) asking about
trading strategies and any nonpublic information on which those class members
relied. 597 Almost 11,000 class members answered "no" to the court's question. 598 The trial court entered judgment for each of those class members, provided that (i) discovery had produced no evidence inconsistent with the answer
and (ii) the class member's claim exceeded $250,000. 599 Those were the judgments subject to the appeal. 600
On the appeal, the defendants objected to that process, 601 arguing that "class
members should have been asked whether they would have transacted if they
had known that the statements were false. "602 The Seventh Circuit rejected
this view because investors who might have purchased if they had known that
the defendants' statements were false might not have purchased if they also

591. Glichenhaus, 787 F.3d at 413-14.
592. Id. at 429.
593. Id. (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. john Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988) (plurality))).
594. Id. at 4 30. The trial judge concluded that other avenues of rebutting the FOTM presumptioneither showing that market makers were aware of the truth or that the truth had entered the market and
dissipated the effects of the falsehoods-"had already been rejected by the jury in Phase!." Id.
595. Id.
596. Id. at 4 31.
597. Id.
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Id. at 414, 4 31 n.14. The defendants were entitled to judgment against class members who
(i) failed to answer the court's question either time it was sent out and (ii) had claims exceeding
$250,000. Id. at 431. About 30,000 claims had not been resolved. Id. at 431-32.
601. Id. at 4 32.
602. Id. (emphasis deleted).
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had known that those statements had inflated the price that the investors would
have to pay. 603 To defendants further point that the court's question was "meaningless" because "all class members could see how they needed to respond in
order to recover," the appellate court responded that, while the question was
"imperfect," class members had to answer under penalty of perjury and some
of them had answered that they would have purchased the shares even knowing
that the defendants had inflated the price. 604
Damages, reliance, and class certification. BP, P.L.C. ("BP") co-owned and coleased the Macondo exploratory well in the Gulf of Mexico. 605 An April 20,
2010 blowout at that well poured oil into the Gulf until the well was capped
on July 15, 2010. 606 Plaintiffs brought a Rule lOb-5 action against BP and
two executives, suing on behalf of two classes of investors: (i) those who acquired BP ADS between November 8, 2007, and April 20, 2010 (the "prespill class"); and (ii) those who acquired BP ADS between April 26, 2010, and
May 28, 2010 (the "post-spill" class). 607 On a motion to certify the classes
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)-which requires "that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members" 608-the district court certified the post-spill
class but denied certification to the pre-spill class, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed
on Rule 23(f) review. 609 The alleged misrepresentations in the pre-spill class period included (i) assertions that BP was implementing safety improvements recommended by a commission established after an explosion at a BP refinery in Texas;
(ii) statements about the company's Operating Management System, which the
company said would standardize safety processes across all of its lines of business
but which did not apply to sites such as the one at which the Gulf blowout occurred; and (iii) representations in filings with regulatory agencies that BP had
the ability and equipment to respond to a deepwater oil spill. 610 The alleged misrepresentations in the post-spill period concerned the rate at which oil was flowing
into the Gulf at the blowout site. 611
The plaintiffs proposed to calculate damages as the difference between the price
paid by each purchaser and the price that the purchaser would have paid had the

603. Id.
604. Id. at 432-33. The court also rejected defense arguments based on discovery limitations during the second phase. Id. at 4 32.
605. Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C., 800 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2015).
606. Id.
607. Id. at 677 (identifying defendants); id. at 679-80 (identifying claim as brought under Rule lOb-5
and also the classes); In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 10-md-2185, 2014 WL 2112823, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
May 20, 2014) (providing dates for two class periods, but stating that the first date of the second class
would begin on either April 26 or 29, depending on whether the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to
amend); id. at *14 (stating that a third amended complaint would include an alleged misrepresentation
on April 24 so that the start date for the second class could begin on April 26); id. at *17 (granting leave
to amend).
608. Fm R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3).
609. Ludlow, 800 F.3d at 677, 680, 692.
610. Id. at 678-79.
611. Id. at 679.
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misrepresentations not been made (the "true value" of the equity). 612 Turning first
to the post-spill class, the Fifth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs' expert computed
the true value of the equity on each day of the post-spill period by identifying six
events that the expert concluded to have alerted the market that the spill rate was
greater than BP represented ("corrective events"), using an event study to isolate
the abnormal decline in BP's share price after each of these events, starting with
the last one, then carrying the abnormal declines back through the class period
while adjusting the amount of the price inflation after each event. 613 Using this
model, those buying at the beginning of the post-spill class period would have
overpaid by the total of all of the abnormal declines, those buying after the first
corrective event and before the second corrective event would have overpaid by
the total of all abnormal declines minus the abnormal decline after the first corrective event, and so forth. 614 The defendants contended that some of the corrective
events identified by plaintiffs' expert were not related to the alleged misrepresentations about the spill rate. 615 The Fifth Circuit responded that this possibility did
not counsel against Rule 23(b)(3) class certification because "the question of
whether certain corrective disclosures are linked to the alleged misrepresentations
in question is undeniably common to the class. "616
The defendants also argued that the post-spill certification was improper because some of the corrective events concerned damages from the oil spill rather
than alleged misrepresentations about the spill rate. 617 The Fifth Circuit agreed
"that damages stemming from the spill itself are not recoverable under the plaintiffs' theory of liability" 618 but held that the "tightness of th[e] fit" "between the
corrective event and the misstatements ... is a question common to the class. "619
Relevant to both defense arguments, the court noted that the plaintiffs' expert's
methodology allowed for removal of any particular corrective event from the
model (and therefore removal of the associated abnormal stock price change
after the event) if the event was found not to correct the misrepresentation on
which the plaintiffs sued. 620
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that, because the plaintiffs could not, under Supreme Court authority, be required to prove loss causation in order to win
class certification, they could not, in order to win certification, be required to

612. Id. at 683.
613. See id. at 683-84.
614. See id. at 684.
615. Id. at 687 (citing an announcement by BP that its board was meeting "to discuss alternatives
to paying a dividend").
616. Id. at 688.
617. Id.
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. Id. at 688-89.
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prove a perfect damages case. 621 Accordingly, "the district court did not err in
refusing to resolve concerns about the inclusion of certain corrective events at
the class certification stage. "622
Moving to the pre-spill class, the court of appeals observed that the plaintiffs
were proceeding on the "materialization of the risk" theory-i.e., that the defendants "allegedly misstated the efficacy of its safety procedures, creating an impression that the risk of a catastrophic failure was lower than it actually was .
taking away plaintiffs' 'opportunity to decide whether to divest in light of the
heightened risk."' 623 This meant, however, that the key question was not
whether a class member paid an inappropriately high price for the stock but
whether the class member "would not have bought BP stock at all were it not
for the alleged misrepresentations-a determination not derivable as a common
question, but rather one requiring individualized inquiry. "624 The plaintiffs' expert offered no "mechanism for separating" those class members who would not
have bought if the market had known of the higher-than-represented risk from
those class members who would have purchased anyway. 625 While the plaintiffs
argued that the FOTM presumption removed these individual questions, the
Fifth Circuit responded that "[t]he [FOTM] theory does not provide any presumptions with regard to loss causation-whether the misstatement caused
the loss. And here, where the economic loss depends on the posture of the plaintiff vis-a-vis risk tolerance, that loss causation, and thus damage, cannot be presumed nor can it be found class-wide." 626
Significance and analysis. The BP decision merits two comments. First, it reminds us that proof of damages-in a securities class action lawsuit where plaintiffs rely on the FOTM presumption and seek out-of-pocket damages 627 requires two steps: (i) determination of the price at which the stock would
have traded absent the asserted fraud and (ii) submission by individual class
members of claims proving their purchases during the period of the fraud.
While the second obviously raises individual questions that do not prevent
class certification, class certification is dependent on a common way to prove
the first.
Second, doctrinally, the court seems to lose its way when discussing the prespill class. The court's analysis seems to center not on loss causation or damages
but reliance-proof of the facts on which the plaintiff class members relied in
621. Id. at 687-88 (citing Erica P. john Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186
(2011))
622. Id. at 688. The Fifth Circuit said, at the outset of its analysis, that it was reviewing the certification decision "for abuse of discretion within the ambit of the controlling rules of substance and
procedure." Id. at 680.
623. Id. at 689 (quoting plaintiffs, without sourcing quotations).
624. Id. at 690.

625. Id.
626. Id. at 690-91 (footnote omitted).
62 7. Id. at 683 (explaining out-of-pocket damages as "the difference between the inflated price at
which the plaintiffs bought their stock, buoyed by BP's alleged misrepresentations about the magnitude of the spill, and the 'true' price, meaning the theoretical price that the BP stock would have
traded for had the relevant information been properly disclosed").
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deciding whether to purchase. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit employed, as an alternative basis for its ruling on the pre-spill class, the conclusion that the plaintiffs
themselves rebutted the FOTM reliance presumption by taking the position
that the pre-spill purchasers did not purchase on the basis of price alone. 628
SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT ("SLUSA")

SLUSA defines a "covered class action" as a lawsuit brought on behalf of more
than fifty persons. 629 SLUSA requires that covered class actions be based on federal securities law and proceed in federal court if plaintiffs "alleg[e 'an untrue
statement' or 'a misrepresentation'] or omission of a material fact in connection
with the purchase or sale" of a "covered security"-essentially a security listed on
a national exchange. 630 SLUSA forbids the "maint[enance]" of a covered class action in which the plaintiffs make such an allegation where the class action is
"based upon the statutory or common law of any State. "631 If plaintiffs file a covered class action in state court-asserting state law claims based on misrepresentations or omissions in the purchase or sale of a covered security-defendants
can remove the case to federal court. 632 The federal court then properly dismisses the case as precluded by SLUSA. 633
The In re Kingate Management Ltd. Litigation plaintiffs purchased shares in funds
(the "Funds")-which shares were not "covered securities"-after the Funds declared that they would in turn invest in exchange-listed stocks issued by S&P
100 companies-which stocks were "covered securities. "634 The Funds gave the
money to Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("BMIS"), and, although
BMIS provided statements purporting to show that it had invested the money in
shares issued by S&P 100 companies, BMIS in fact used the money for Mr. Madoff's
personal benefit and to pay investors who sought to redeem amounts previously
placed with BMIS. 635 In Kingate Management, the plaintiffs asserted a variety of
628. Id. at 691. In one more open market case addressing loss causation, the Fifth Circuit held
that neither news of government subpoenas served on the issuer nor an analyst report summarizing
a whistleblower lawsuit filed months before that report constituted a "corrective disclosure" independently and, even when considered together, they were not corrective. Sapssov v. Health Mgmt.
Assocs., Inc., 608 F. App'x 855, 863-64 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
629. 15 U.5.C. §§ 77p(f)(2)(A)(i), 78bb(f)(5)(B)(i) (2012). The statutes carve out derivative actions. Id. §§ 77p(f)(2)(B), 78bb(f)(5)(C)
630. Id. § 77p(b)(l) (2012) (referring to "an untrue statement"); id. § 78bb(f)(l) (referring to "a
misrepresentation"); see id. § 77p(f)(3) (cross-referencing the definition of "covered securities"); id.
§ 78bb(f)(5)(E) (same). See generally id. § 77r(b) (defining "covered securities").
631. Id. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(l)
632. Id. §§ 77p(c), 78bb(f)(2)
633. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006) ("[SLUSA] .
denies plaintiffs the right to use the class-action device to vindicate certain [state-law] claims.");
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 54 7 U.S. 633, 64 3 (2006) ("§ 77p(c) 'provides that any class action
described in Subsection (b) that is brought in a State court shall be removable to Federal district
court, and may be dismissed pursuant to the provisions of subsection (b)."' (quoting S. REP. No.
105-182, at 8 (1998))); id. at 644 ("If the action is precluded, neither the district court nor the
state court may entertain it, and the proper course is to dismiss.").
634. 784 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 2015)
635. Id. at 133-34.
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state law claims against the Funds and individuals and entities affiliated with the
Funds-including officers, directors, managers, auditors, a consultant, and a fund
administrator. 636 The district court dismissed all of the claims as SLUSAprecluded. 637
The Second Circuit concluded that, because the plaintiffs bought uncovered
securities, but expected that the proceeds of their purchases would be invested
in covered securities, and because the proceeds were not so invested, "the essential element of SLUSA that requires falsity 'in connection with' a purchase or sale
of a covered security is satisfied in this case." 638 The court then turned to "the
meaning of SLUSA's ambiguous use of the word 'alleging,' when it proscribes
the 'maint [enance]' of a covered class action 'alleging ... [false conduct] in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security,"' characterizing the issue
as one of "first impression" in the Second Circuit. 639 The court rejected two possible interpretations: (i) "'alleging' . . mean[s] that SLUSA applies to any claim
that includes any reference whatsoever to the false conduct specified in SLUSA,
even if the false conduct is completely irrelevant to the state law theory of the
defendant's liability"; and (ii) "alleging" does not cover "extraneous pleaded
facts," but it "encompasses any assertion of the types of false conduct specified
in SLUSA's references to the anti-falsity provisions of the [Securities and Exchange]
Acts that must be proved in order for the state law claim to succeed-even when
the defendant is not alleged to have participated in the falsity." 640 The Second Circuit instead selected a third interpretation: (iii) "alleging" means "that the complaint must allege conduct by the defendant that is specified in SLUSA and that
forms the basis for the defendant's state law liability." 641
This selection meant that "SLUSA's preclusion applies when the state law
claim is predicated on conduct of the defendant specified in SLUSA's operative
provisions, which reference the anti-falsity provisions of the [Securities and Exchange] Acts." 642 The preclusion extends to a claim based on conduct by the defendant that violates those anti-falsity provisions (i) even if the plaintiff has no
private cause of action against the defendant under the federal securities laws,
as would be true if the conduct violated only Rule lOb-5 and the plaintiff simply
had held stock as a result of the defendant's conduct instead of having bought or
sold securities as a result of that conduct, 643 and (ii) even if the anti-falsity provi-

636. Id. at 133; id. at 134 (listing some of the claims as "fraud, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, gross negligence, breach of contractual obligations, breach of fiduciary
duties, constructive trust, mutual mistake, unjust enrichment, and aiding and abetting various aforementioned violations").
637. Id. at 135.
638. Id. at 142.
639. Id. at 143 (quoting 15 USC§§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(l) (2012))
640. Id. at 143-44 (articulating two interpretations); id. at 144-50 (rejecting those interpretations).
641. Id. at 144, 149. The court provided examples of claims that, under its interpretation of "alleging," SLUSA does not bar. Id. at 148-49.
642. Id. at 149.
64 3. Id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)).

1078

The Business Lawyer; Vol. 71, Summer 2016

sion that the defendant's conduct allegedly violated does not create a private cause
of action at all, as would be true if the conduct violated only section l 7(a)(2) of the
Securities Act. 644 The Second Circuit emphasized that SLUSA's preclusion extends
to state law claims based on such conduct, even though the state law claim (such as
a breach of contract claim) does not, itself, require that the defendant have spoken
or written a falsehood. 645
The court of appeals applied this interpretation to the five relevant categories
of the plaintiffs' allegations ("Groups l-5"). 646 The court concluded that
Group 1-"predicat[ing] liability on charges that Defendants fraudulently
made misrepresentations and misleading omissions regarding the Funds' investments with Madoff and their oversight of the Funds' investments"-alleged
"falsity 'in connection with' covered securities" and "conduct by Defendants
falling within SLUSA's specifications of conduct prohibited by the anti-falsity
provisions of the [Securities and Exchange] Acts." 647 SLUSA precluded those
allegations. 648 The Group 2 allegations differed from those in Group 1 only
by charging that the defendants negligently made misrepresentations and omitted material facts about "the Funds' investments with Madoff and ... oversight
of Madoff's operations. "649 Because those allegations were based on the same
conduct by the defendants-"conduct prohibited by not only the anti-fraud
provisions of the [Exchange] Act, but also § l 7(a)(2) of the [Securities]
Act," 650 which imposes culpability based on the defendant's negligence 651 the court saw "no reason why the absence of scienter should prevent SLUSA
from barring the Group 2 allegations," and ordered that the district court "dismiss any allegations of the type defined as Group 2. "652 Similarly, the Group 3
allegations-"that Defendants aided and abetted (rather than directly committed) the frauds described in Group l "-were SLUSA-precluded. 653
The Second Circuit, however, held that SLUSA did not preclude the Group 4
or Group 5 allegations. 654 The plaintiffs predicated Group 4 "on Defendants'
breach of contractual, fiduciary, and/or tort-based duties to Plaintiffs to provide
competent management, consulting, auditing, or administrative services to the
Funds, thus allowing Madoff's frauds to go undetected, causing Plaintiffs'
losses." 655 Those allegations did not "requir[e] a showing of false conduct by
644. Id. at 149-50 (citing Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1992)).
645. Id. at 149. The court also held that a district court on a SLUSA preclusion motion may "ascertain ... independently" that the defendant's alleged false conduct involved "covered securities"
where the complaint does not disclose the status of the securities involved. Id. at 150.
646. Id. at 134-35 (identifying the categories).
647. Id. at 151.
648. Id.
649. Id.
650. Id.
651. SEC v. Ginder, 752 F.3d 569, 574 (2d Cir. 2014).
652. Kingate Mgmt., 784 F.3d at 151.
653. Id. The Second Circuit noted that the SEC can pursue aiders and abettors, although private
claimants cannot do so through claims under Rule lOb-5. Id. at 151 & n.22.
654. Id. at 151-52.
655. Id. at 151.
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the named Defendants of the sort specified in SLUSA" and therefore survived a
SLUSA preclusion attack. 656 The Group 5 allegations "assert[ed] that Plaintiffs
are entitled to compensation for fees paid by the Funds to certain Defendants
pursuant to contracts between the Funds and those Defendants because those
Defendants failed to perform the duties for which the fees were paid, and because the fees based on purported profits and values of the Funds were computed on the basis of inaccurate values. "657 Those allegations, too, survived
SLUSA challenge because they did "not depend on conduct by Defendants within
SLUSA's specifications"; indeed, those allegations did not depend on defendants
having committed any deception at all. 658
The Second Circuit follows the rule that, where SLUSA precludes some claims
in a complaint but not others, the court should dismiss the precluded claims and
proceed with the rest. 659 Accordingly, the court of appeals remanded for the district court to dismiss the "claims (or portions thereof) [that] fall within the terms
of SLUSA's preclusion" and "proceed with respect to the other claims. "660
MISCELLANEOUS CASES

The Eighth Circuit held last year that an issuer had violated Rule lOb-9 and
Rule lOb-5 by breaking escrow and accessing funds in an all-or-none issuance
before the issuer had actually received the minimum amount that the offering
specified. 661 The Sixth Circuit held that Rule 15c3-3(l) does not create an implied right of action. 662 In another case, the Sixth Circuit held that notes, sold
to finance purchases of oil that would be held in tankers until the oil price increased, fell within the "any note" phrase in the federal law definition of "security."663 The Third Circuit found an interest in a limited liability company ("LLC")
to fall outside the "investment contract" phrase in that definition, in part because
of the role the purchaser played in a partnership that was legally different from,
but was associated with, the LLC. 664

656. Id. at 152.
657. Id.
658. Id. (emphasis added).
659. Id. at 153 (citing Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 4 7 (2d
Cir. 2005), vacated on other grounds, 54 7 U.S. 71 (2006)).
660. Id. at 153-54.
661. Doud v. Toy Box Dev. Co., 798 F.3d 709, 712-14 (8th Cir. 2015).
662. Harris v. TD Ameritrade, Inc., 805 F.3d 664, 666-67 (6th Cir. 2015).
663. SEC v. Zada, 787 F.3d 375, 379-81 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing 15 USC § 77b(a)(l) (2012)
(defining "security" to include "any note"); id. § 78c(a)(l0) (same)).
664. Rossi v. Quarmley, 604 F. App'x 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that, because the plaintiff's
"control of [the related partnership] was ... essential to the success of [the LLC]," his contribution to
the LLC "was hardly limited to an investment of money, and his interest was not an investment contract but a commercial venture").

